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# US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

## THE LESSONS OF STRATEGIC SURPRISE:



### PEARL HARBOR, CUBA, AND THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST CRISIS (U)

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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(C) SUMMARY (U)

1. (C) Pearl Harbor, Cuba, and the 1973 Middle East War were three very different types of crisis, yet in their diversity certain commonalities and lessons emerge which can contribute to improved strategic planning. In all three of the crisis periods, the actors responded (1) on the basis of their own national interests, (2) within the constraints of a short timeframe, and (3) with a limited choice of alternatives. Each crisis was preceded by numerous indicators which were incorrectly analyzed because of preconceived notions, stereotypes, and personal biases.

2. (C) Extraordinary and sometimes improvised methods of international diplomacy and communication were utilized in the search for solutions. Although fears of encirclement and containment influenced action and reaction, the importance of formal alliances was minor. The numbness which analysts felt in each crisis due to previous false alarms was exacerbated by enemy deception, restrictions on access to raw data, secrecy in decisionmaking, an abundance of irrelevant data, simple bad luck, delays, technological and logistical surprises, and, most importantly, by their own prejudices and perceptions.

3. (C) From these common elements certain lessons emerge. The importance of surprise, a credible deterrent, direct and constant communication among leaders, flexibility, deception, timing, and the maintenance of forward deployed forces and strategic mobility has been revalidated. The importance of alliances and their operation during crises has apparently been exaggerated. The importance of on the ground intelligence has been minimized. No ultimate intelligence source--"MAGIC," the U-2, or satellite reconnaissance--is useful without sound political and behavioral analysis. Even then, we must accept that crises do not often develop at the time and in the manner anticipated by the "experts." This does not deny the proven need for long range planning, however. Such planning allows the perception of more options and the time for more choice and commitment. Conf

4. (C) US national and popular will must be clearly demonstrated to ensure that American intentions are clearly understood by all potential adversaries. This objective can only be achieved by a strong military capability and presence supported by an aware citizenry. Future crises similar to Pearl Harbor, Cuba, and the Middle East can be averted by such a demonstration of will. In addition, frequent rotations of duty should be required to avoid overspecialization in strategic intelligence and more improvization

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should be encouraged in diplomacy and strategy formulation. A greater diversity of viewpoints should be encouraged and intellectual debate with nongovernmental scholars and specialists should be sought to challenge the conventional wisdom. Inbreeding among intelligence documents has long stifled originality. Also, increased attention should be given to the development of additional airlift and troop mobility capabilities and to on the ground cloak and dagger intelligence gathering activities. Finally, because of the increasing interdependence of economies and use of embargoes, a thorough analysis should be made of the sources of vital raw materials and the potential for conflict and blackmail. A major R&D effort should then be undertaken to develop substitutes and synthetics.

5. (S) Trends indicate that while interdependence, detente, sophistication in crisis handling, and international political diplomacy are becoming more important; so are economic boycotts and embargoes, despite past failures and their counterproductive results. In this environment, the increased dependence on intelligence estimates in selecting and implementing foreign policy makes better strategic planning even more critical. The dangers of strategic surprise can only be eliminated if intelligence analysts and strategic planners base their conclusions primarily on an objective analysis of enemy capabilities, constrained where necessary only by a projection of relative order of priority regarding utilization, and remain prepared to react to any capability within that range.

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## (U) INTRODUCTION

1. Strategic surprise succeeded for the aggressor at Pearl Harbor, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in the 1973 Middle East Crisis, not because American military and diplomatic policymakers were uncertain about what the enemy was planning but because they were all "too certain." The key to understanding the significance of these three crises, therefore, lies primarily in an examination of the role played by intelligence processors and decisionmakers rather than the failure of the intelligence gatherers and technology. National intelligence prediction failed in all three of the crises under consideration. Diplomacy succeeded in Cuba and in the Middle East but failed at Pearl Harbor.

2. In terms of both long-range projections and short-term analysis, the role of intelligence and strategic planning in the crisis decisionmaking process is becoming increasingly important. As a result, a number of prominent political scientists have recently undertaken efforts related to case study comparisons of various crisis situations. Researchers in the areas of belief systems and decisionmaking such as Ole Holsti, Roberta Wohlstetter, and others have long held, however, that analysts seldom review incoming information objectively. Instead, such information is usually unconsciously fitted into preexisting intelligence positions and preconceived behavior patterns or else simply disregarded as irrelevant or erroneous.

3. This study is an attempt to validate and expand these conclusions, to examine reasons for the successes and failures of diplomacy, and to identify relevant trends and commonalities upon which to base useful recommendations for improved strategy formulation. The findings are based upon the most significant contributions of historians and political theorists and a review of various official intelligence documents, interviews, and personal analysis.

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## CHAPTER 1 (U)

### THE ENVIRONMENT OF CRISIS: PEARL HARBOR (1941)

#### 1. Prior Indications of Crisis.

a. President Roosevelt was convinced before the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable. The volume and diversity of data provided by American intelligence agents was excellent. The breaking of the top priority Japanese diplomatic code enabled us to anticipate attack. Although there were warnings that the attack would occur at Pearl Harbor, such a bold maneuver was by no means anticipated at the time by either diplomatic or military analysts.

b. The United States and Japan began slowly moving toward crisis after the Japanese invasion of Manchukuo in 1931. From then on, "the oil gauge and the clock stood side by side. Each fall in the level brought the hour of decision closer."<sup>1</sup> The United States attempted to influence Japanese policy by the use of progressively stricter boycotts and embargoes.

c. Subsequently, the signing of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact and the Japanese treaty of neutrality with Russia meant that Japan would be forced to look southward for its supply of vital natural resources. It was in this region that US and Japanese interests and ambitions clashed.

d. The United States and Japan presented a number of proposals and counterproposals for peace between 9 April 1941 and 20 November 1941. These diplomatic efforts were doomed to failure, however, because the United States refused to accede to Japan's stated vital national interest of maintaining a strong protective position in China. Our negotiators insisted that Japan remove all of her forces, thereby leaving China in turmoil and hostile to Japan. After 26 July 1941, President Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the United States, closed all US ports to Japanese vessels, and proclaimed a strict embargo on the sale of American petroleum products to Japan. This action forced Japan to accept American demands for withdrawal from China and Indochina or obtain raw materials elsewhere.

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<sup>1</sup>Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, 1950, p. 244.

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e. The real period of crisis began with the fall of the Konoye Cabinet on 16 October 1941. After that time diplomacy played a minor role to preparations for war. Although Tojo became Prime Minister because he opposed negotiations, the new cabinet labored to give the impression that it was still interested in discussions.

f. As early as January 1941, the US Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, had obtained information from the Peruvian Ambassador in Tokyo, as well as from a number of Japanese sources, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. Neither Grew nor American intelligence took this warning seriously.

g. The United States intercepted a message from Japan to Ambassador Nomura in Washington on 5 November 1941 which stated that the deadline for diplomatic agreement with the United States was 25 November. This deadline was later extended to 29 November.

h. In late November, Ambassador Grew and US intelligence sources warned that a surprise aggressive movement might emerge from Japan suddenly in any direction at any time. A message intercepted on 6 December from Japanese intelligence in Honolulu advised Tokyo that the opportunity for surprise attack against Hawaii was good.

i. The Japanese 14-Part Message decrypted in Washington on 6 and 7 December 1941 convinced the President of the immediacy of war. The prior indicators and intelligence were not evaluated in such a manner, however, to predict that war would begin with a pre-emptive attack on US territory in Hawaii.

j. Other significant fragments of intelligence pointed to a Japanese attack:

(1) Large troop and ship movements in Indochina and along the China coast.

(2) Changes in Japanese naval call signs on 1 November and 1 December.

(3) A radio silence in the Japanese Navy.

## 2. Impact of Surprise.

a. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the retaliatory powers of the United States were crippled for more than a year while the Japanese escaped with minimum damage to their attacking forces. The

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United States defending forces were unable to counter the Japanese attack.

b. In contrast to the physical damage inflicted upon US forces, the surprise attack served to unify a previously divided American public opinion behind the war effort. No other single action could have accomplished this feat so quickly and efficiently.

c. Morale in the American military and intelligence communities was lowered as a result of the surprise. Rightly or wrongly, scapegoats were found for the disaster and a number of promising careers were ended. The American political elite has not yet regained faith in the validity of US military intelligence.

### 3. Time Constraints.

a. By September 1941, according to reports of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, Japanese oil reserves stood at less than 50 million barrels. Delay, once the decision for war had been made, meant greater risks due to lack of oil and other vital raw materials. Japan realized that to obtain these resources, necessary for a long war of attrition, she must expel the United States and Great Britain from the East Indies and gain control of the region. Accepting this realization, the factor of the weather added urgency to the decision to go to war. October and November were the best months for landing operations in the East Indies because of the northeasterly monsoons. Such operations would have become practically impossible after January.

b. Although the United States had begun preparing for war in 1939 by building up its military strength, in the American viewpoint it was more advantageous that it come in 1942 or 1943. Every effort was made to gain time after it became clear that a war on two fronts was a distinct possibility. The Japanese realized any delay would mean that the US forces would be stronger.

c. Military action quickly outpaced diplomatic and political reaction in both the United States and Japan immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although the Japanese Ambassadors were instructed to deliver the fourteenth part of the Japanese 14-Part Message breaking off diplomatic relations at 1300 on 7 December Washington time in order to precede the attack, the message was not delivered until 1420. The US Congress passed a resolution on 8 December declaring that a state of war had existed between the United States and Japan since the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

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## 4. Impact of US Interests.

a. Prior to 1940 it was in the interest of the United States to maintain Japan as a counterforce to communism in Asia. After 1940 Japan emerged as a more immediate threat to US interests.

b. Four broad interests served as the basis for US action and diplomacy:

- (1) equality of commercial opportunity;
- (2) noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations;
- (3) respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations; and
- (4) prevention of violent changes to the status quo in Asia and the Pacific.

c. The United States was primarily interested in protecting the Philippines and its other Pacific territories and preventing the fall of its allies (Great Britain and Holland) fighting in Europe due to the necessity of their sending forces to Asia to protect their colonies.

## 5. Impact of Adversary's Interests.

a. The United States represented the status quo power in the Pacific; Japan represented the revisionist power. Japan sincerely felt that the extension of its control over the Western Pacific was both natural and destined and that it was mutually desirable for all concerned. Japan claimed only to be interested in preserving peace and order in the Far East.

b. Japan desperately needed oil, scrap iron, bauxite, and other raw materials to expand her economy and maintain her military forces. The world depression had already made it difficult for the Japanese to sell their goods abroad. British, Dutch, and American embargoes aimed at forcing Japan out of China and breaking her ties with the Axis powers were unsuccessful in their purpose. Instead, they forced Japan to look southward for supplies and markets.

c. The Pearl Harbor attack served as a positive action on the part of Japan in obtaining vital material resources over the

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long-range period. Its root lay in a chain of events resulting from opposition to and misperception of these interests by the United States beginning with the insistence on total evacuation of Japanese forces from China and culminating in the embargoes. The United States could not accept the creation of a Japanese sphere of "coprosperity" in the Far East which Japan felt was so essential to her survival and economic growth.

#### 6. Impact of Allies' Interests.

a. The fact that a declaration of war against Japan coincided with the interests of our allies in Europe was secondary once the United States was attacked. Britain and Holland had feared that a Japanese attack on their colonies in the Far East would force them to open a distant second front in their war against the Axis powers. They saw little success in such an effort without overt military assistance from the United States. They were seriously concerned, since the United States had refused to obligate herself to enter the war or even to define the circumstances which might lead her to do so. Throughout the summer and fall of 1941, the Netherlands sought to gain an understanding of US intentions if the Indies were attacked but received no definitive answers.

b. Germany and Italy had long pressed Japan to declare war in the Far East to divert Allied forces to the area. Although these pressures may have had some impact on Japan's final move toward war, the decision was made primarily on the basis of self-interest and perceived economic necessity.

#### 7. Coordination with Allies.

a. There was little real military cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth prior to the formal staff conferences held in Washington in the spring of 1941. These conferences sought to deter Axis expansion of the war by coordinated strategic deployments, to develop unified plans in the event of US participation in the war, and to devise ways to assure maintenance of freedom of the seas. US and British strategic interests differed, however, and a later conference held in Singapore in April failed to establish a combined battle plan for operations in the Pacific.

b. Konoye consistently refrained from informing Germany about the details of Japanese negotiations with the American Government. Japan apparently coordinated to a minimum degree with Germany and Italy on other matters also. Assurances had been sought that

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Germany would not contest Japanese occupation of former Allied colonies in the Far East. Beyond this, Japan's detailed plans for attack were the work of Admiral Yamamoto. The Germans and Italians were pleased to see any form of aggression in the area.

## 8. Impact of Public Opinion.

a. The American people were reluctant to go to war until they were given no alternative. By 1941, however, the strength of isolationism had run its course. Roosevelt worked hard to prepare the nation for the war he saw approaching. "From a peaceful nation unaware of its responsibility he had forged a military power."<sup>2</sup> The American people were generally unaware that the talks with the Japanese were coming to an end in the last days before Pearl Harbor but were not told that we might soon be at war. The lack of public belligerency perhaps contributed to the Japanese misperception of American will. The manner of the attack, however, quickly solidified public opinion behind the declaration of war.

b. Although Japanese opinion was divided for some time, the creation of the Tojo Cabinet expelled all effective opposition to war in Japan. The nation was psychologically prepared for war and launched into the fray with zeal and enthusiasm.

## 9. Role of Political Power.

a. The United States refrained from threats and coercion against Japan until 1940. Roosevelt counted on the continued resistance of China and a growing dissatisfaction and impatience on the part of the Japanese public and the Navy with the sacrifices required for Japan's aggressive policies. Japanese political power was viewed as an effective counterweight to communism in Asia.

b. During the winter of 1940-1941 the situation became more serious, but American policy continued to oppose war. Subtle warnings and attempts to negotiate were backed by economic sanctions. America's terms for peace were irreconcilable with Japanese interests and.

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<sup>2</sup>Leonard Baker, Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor, a Great President in a Time of Crisis, 1970, p. 308.

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strategy, however. In sum, the Japanese felt that the political power of the United States, based on democratic principles, was weak and consequently they had little respect for it. US efforts to avoid "creating an incident" seemed to confirm these views.

c. Since Japan was ruled by an authoritarian regime, domestic political power became identified with support for war after 16 October 1941. Subsequently, political maneuvers and negotiations were used to deceive the United States and to hide the true Japanese commitment to war.

10. Role of Military Power.

a. The Japanese were cognizant of the superior military strength of the United States. They gambled that we would not "choose" to win a long war, however, and decided to resist an American counter-offensive as long as necessary to grind down American morale and will to win. Japan was well aware that she would become militarily impotent unless her forces were supplied with the necessary raw materials which were being embargoed.

b. The Japanese military played a direct role in moving the nation toward war. The Navy served as a moderating influence for peace until the summer of 1941 when the choice became agreement with the United States, prolonged sacrifices due to critical shortages, or war. The Navy had previously opposed moving southward until an agreement had been reached in China, while the Army consistently pressed for war. The more militant voices became predominant in November of 1941 when General Hideki Tojo became Prime Minister and diplomacy failed to offer any hope for accommodation with the United States.

11. Role of Economic Power.

a. The United States had the resources Japan desperately needed to maintain her preeminence as a major power in the Far East. The successively stricter US embargoes against Japan served as a challenge rather than a restraint upon Japan's aggressive policies. Secretary of State Hull's repeated warnings that such embargoes would reduce any remaining influence of Japan's advocates for peace were realized.

b. The exercise of the joint American-British-Dutch boycotts, freezing of assets, and embargoes of oil, bauxite, and other vital raw

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materials, forced Japanese leaders to attack Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941. This does not deny that such an attack might have eventually occurred anyway, but rather emphasizes the fact that other policies might have gained valuable time for the United States in the strengthening of American military forces, while the economic and military position of Japan would have continued to deteriorate.

## 12. Impact of Intelligence.

a. Japanese intelligence operating from Honolulu supplied military authorities in Tokyo with accurate, detailed information on US deployments in Pearl Harbor and, prior to the attack, advised of the likelihood of a successful surprise attack on the facility. Its success enabled the Japanese attack forces to deal a crippling blow to the US Navy in the Pacific. American intelligence failed to produce an accurate reading of Japanese capabilities and intentions prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor despite the fact that we possessed a massive variety of information sources for analysis.

b. The intelligence resources available to the United States included:<sup>3</sup>

- (1) Top priority Japanese worldwide diplomatic codes.
- (2) Many codes used by Japanese agents around the world.
- (3) Results of radio traffic analysis which allowed the pinpointing of various Japanese fleet units.
- (4) The competent economic and political analysis provided by Ambassador Grew in Tokyo and various naval attaches and military observers throughout the Far East.
- (5) Results of British intelligence.
- (6) Information provided by experienced foreign correspondents and newspapermen in the Far East.
- (7) The Japanese press.
- (8) Inter-governmental personal contacts.

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<sup>3</sup>Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision, 1962, pp. 382-386.

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c. Roberta Wohlstetter has done perhaps the best and most exhaustive study to date on the impact and cause of the failure of intelligence at Pearl Harbor. Her conclusion is that we failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor because all the signals were imbedded in an atmosphere of "noise"--not for want of relevant information but rather an overabundance of irrelevant data. In Washington, the signals from Pearl Harbor were competing with a plethora of signals from Europe. In Honolulu, the competition was with signals indicating a Japanese attack on Russia and expectations of local sabotage.<sup>4</sup>

### 13. Alternatives.

a. Military retaliation was the only US option seriously considered. President Roosevelt was faced with three questions in the days immediately preceding the Pearl Harbor action, however:

(1) Should he promise the British and Dutch that the United States would declare war if Japan attacked their territories or crossed certain boundaries?

(2) Should he warn Japan openly or secretly or offer an ultimatum?

(3) Should he inform Congress about the rapidly approaching crisis and his proposed actions or maintain official silence?

Although the President considered each of these actions, after listening to his advisers, he did none of them. He felt unsure what Congress and the people would approve until the Japanese military movement became better defined. He would not have to contend with the isolationists if the Philippines, Guam, or Hawaii were attacked. With Japan left to decide whether and how the issue of war and peace would be brought before the nation, there was less risk of costly dissention and reaction which would probably have benefited Japan. As Herbert Feis and other historians have pointed out, however, "it caused the growth, as the American people learned more of what had taken place before the Japanese attack, of a sense that they had been led in ignorance."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Feis, op. cit., p. 333.

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b. After the ouster of the Konoye Cabinet, Japan saw war as the only alternative. The decision to attack Hawaii first rather than move directly south was primarily a strategic gamble. The superiority of American forces was recognized and the eventuality of war against the United States was accepted. Time favored the United States rather than Japan. A direct attack on the US Pacific Fleet in Hawaii to achieve maximum immediate destruction was thus accepted as the best alternative action by Japan. It was the culmination of an opportunistic foreign policy, initiated months before, consisting of probing for weaknesses, disguising aims, and moving cautiously step-by-step in search of an expedient time to move.

## 14. The Decisionmaking Process.

a. The decision to go to war was made by the Japanese military leaders within the framework of the Imperial Conference. It was subsequently invested with the aura of "the way of the Emperor."

b. The American response to the Japanese attack was immediate military retaliation. President Roosevelt has been criticized for not informing the American public and Congress of the train of events and their implications preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. Once the attack came, however, the decision to go to war was a reflex and political declarations later caught up with military realities.

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## CHAPTER 2 (U)

## THE ENVIRONMENT OF CRISIS: CUBA (1962)

1. Prior Indications of Crisis.

a. The warmth of Cuban relations with the Soviet Union increased noticeably after Defense Minister Raoul Castro's visit to Moscow in July. Subsequently, refugee groups began to claim that Soviet military "technicians" were arriving in Cuba in large numbers and later that these "technicians" were actually part of military units constructing bases in Cuba. Intelligence experts largely discounted these reports, however, due to (1) the lack of definitive proof; (2) a distrust of the motives of the refugees; (3) the national policy of coexistence and its influence upon their perceptions; and (4) the undependability of untrained observers.

b. Navy air reconnaissance photographed all ships visiting Cuba during the summer of 1962. High level U-2 overflights were conducted at the rate of once each fortnight until September when they were increased to once every week. By late September, US intelligence had evidence of the presence of large numbers of Soviet military personnel, surface-to-air missile sites, and IL-28 light bombers in Cuba.

c. In August, Senator Keating of New York asserted the existence of Soviet missiles and combat troops in Cuba. Continued reports from Cuban refugees strengthened this assertion. Premier Castro was making increasingly bellicose boasts and threats on Cuban radio and television and in the Cuban press, and, in a drunken state, Castro's personal pilot was overheard to boast that Cuba had everything, including atomic weapons. In the intelligence community, John McCone, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, alone suggested to the President as early as August that he believed the Soviet Union was installing offensive weapons in Cuba. Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and other Presidential advisers continued to argue, however, based on their experience, beliefs, and perceptions, that the buildup was merely defensive.

d. The United States did not begin low level reconnaissance flights over Cuba until after the President's 22 October speech. Early reliable information on the number of Soviet troops and their equipment was therefore difficult to obtain. If American intelligence analysts and foreign policy decisionmakers had been more ready to intellectually accept the introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba, certain "signs" might have been detected earlier. One such sign was that many Soviet ships arriving in Cuba were riding high in the water, thus indicating that they were carrying space-consuming cargo.

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e. In summary, there were increasing indications from refugees, press reports, foreign intelligence sources on the ground, and from US reconnaissance and visual observation that the USSR intended to install offensive surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba. Like Pearl Harbor, we failed to anticipate the Cuban crisis and recognize the signals, not because there was a lack of relevant information but because of an overabundance of irrelevant data and a predisposition on the part of American officials to interpret the information in terms of certain expectations.

## 2. Impact of Surprise.

a. As soon as the American leadership and public knew of the Soviet offensive buildup in Cuba, many envisioned the possibility of another Pearl Harbor-type attack against the United States. This comparison and the fears it evoked influenced much of the counsel given to the President. It undoubtedly made a strong US reaction more likely and served to unite public opinion behind the President's policies.

b. The secrecy and deception associated with the Soviet buildup also served to convince the nations of Latin America that they too were threatened by the missiles. It helped sway world opinion in favor of the United States and thus made the fulfillment of Soviet strategy more difficult.

c. Militarily, the surprise had little effect since the missiles were discovered before installation was completed and full SAM coverage had been achieved. Had this not been the case, the United States would have been faced with a fait accompli from which it would have been extremely difficult to force the Russians to retreat so gracefully.

## 3. Time Constraints.

a. Between 18 September and 14 October, American intelligence assembled startling evidence which gradually led to the development of the hypothesis that Soviet offensive weapons were being installed in Cuba. The time was actually rather long in terms of crisis decision-making, but the speed of the Russian buildup intensified the urgency for US countermeasures.

b. The fact that no immediate action was required probably significantly affected the eventual outcome. President Kennedy stated in a 17 December 1962 interview on CBS that, "If we had to act on Wednesday, in the first twenty-four hours, I don't think probably we would have chosen as prudently as we finally did, a 'quarantine' against

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the use of offensive weapons."<sup>1</sup> The implication, therefore, is that the first emotional reaction experienced by the President and his advisers favoring a "surgical air strike" to eliminate the missile sites would have prevailed.

c. The Soviets had planned to have their SAM defenses completed prior to installation of the offensive missiles to preclude a premature American discovery. Delays were encountered, however, which allowed US reconnaissance to detect the installation and therefore confront the Soviet Union prior to completion. The result was that the USSR was caught off-guard and put on the defensive.

d. Finally, the alternative chosen by the United States to meet the missile threat allowed Soviet decisionmakers time to re-evaluate their actions and avoid direct military confrontation. The flexibility of the quarantine delayed any confrontation with the Soviet Union approximately 24 hours.

#### 4. Impact of US Interests.

a. The United States saw the existence of offensive missiles in Cuba as a serious, direct military threat. It endangered the early warning system and increased Russian first-strike capacity against the United States by 50 percent.

b. The success of Soviet strategy in Cuba would have challenged US leadership of the Western world and further weakened hemisphere solidarity. US enemies would have proven their "paper tiger" thesis and presented other challenges at perceived weak points around the world. US security, credibility, and self-respect were at stake.

#### 5. Impact of Adversary Interests.

a. The Soviet Union claimed only to be interested in maintaining Cuba's sovereignty but risked a carefully constructed policy of peaceful coexistence during the missile crisis in order to strengthen its hand in a global strategic sense. A successful conclusion of the crisis from a Russian viewpoint would have left the United States completely discredited in the Western Hemisphere and destroyed any notions of a sphere of influence in the area. It would have forced the Americans to pay such a high price for the removal of the missiles from Cuba that the United States would have been discredited in Europe and Asia also.

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<sup>1</sup>Harold W. Chase and Allen H. Lerman, Kennedy and the Press, 1965, p. 321.

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b. In addition to the obvious military benefits, a victory in Cuba would have strengthened Soviet leadership of the Communist world. Valuable propaganda would have been gained to exploit against the Chinese critics. Respect for Soviet military power and diplomatic ability would have increased throughout the world.

## 6. Impact of Allies' Interests.

a. The interests of US allies in the Western Hemisphere were directly threatened by the installation of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy stressed the vulnerability of cities in Latin America to an attack. These friendly governments also recognized that an American diplomatic defeat would inevitably lead to increased Communist subversion throughout the hemisphere.

b. American allies in Europe felt threatened by the consequences of the missiles if not by the missiles themselves. Turkey and Italy felt directly threatened due to the presence of US missiles on their territory and their use as a pawn during the negotiations. West Berliners worried that the future of their city would be bargained away if America backed down. All Europeans recognized the threat to their existence if the United States and Russia went to war. The fact that Allied interests coincided with American interests served to strengthen US resolve and determination in the confrontation.

c. The Organization of American States met on Tuesday, 23 October, and gave a 19-0 vote in favor of US policy. The NATO nations also expressed strong solidarity during the crisis. This unexpected display of support had both major psychological and practical effect upon the Soviet leaders in forcing them to back down over Cuba.

d. As far as Russia's Eastern European allies were concerned, their interests were not considered but their support was demanded and unconditional. Soviet concern for the interests and existence of the Castro regime may have been genuine, but the predominant factor in Soviet actions was that the installation of the missiles would benefit the Soviet Union foremost. Benefits to the security and prestige of Cuba in the hemisphere were of secondary importance.

## 7. Coordination with Allies.

a. The United States reacted unilaterally in the Cuban missile crisis since its vital security interests were threatened and since the need for secrecy dictated action without prior consultation on a global scale. President Kennedy sought to retain control of decisionmaking and realized that no international organization or diplomatic consultations could force the removal of the missiles. US allies were informed of American decisions after the fact.

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b. As Kennedy did not consult our NATO allies before taking actions which risked world war, neither did Khrushchev apparently seek the opinions of his Warsaw Pact allies before deciding to install the missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Even during the actual crisis, the Soviet Union displayed its disregard for Castro by failing to consult with him. Cuba played a minimal role in the UN talks and Cuban representatives expressed their dissatisfaction with the final agreement.

## 8. Impact of Public Opinion.

a. During the period of decisionmaking, American public opinion was generally aware that US relations with Cuba were becoming more strained but were not officially told that the Soviet Union had placed offensive missiles in Cuba. The American public strongly supported the position taken by the President once the nature of the crisis became apparent. Those critical of his actions primarily felt that stronger steps should have been taken. Most major newspapers editorialized in favor of the President after his 22 October speech. American public reaction undoubtedly served as one factor in forcing Khrushchev to moderate his position on Cuba.

b. The Soviet and Cuban peoples were kept unaware of the actual realities, decisions and terms of negotiation during the crisis. It is therefore doubtful that their opinions affected decisionmaking in any way.

## 9. Role of Political Power.

a. Khrushchev seriously misjudged the leadership abilities and determination of President Kennedy because of his failure to react forcefully to the Bay of Pigs crisis and to the construction of the Berlin Wall, and because of personal impressions gained at their summit meeting in Vienna. These impressions, combined with a general misunderstanding of the strengths of democracies, led the Soviet Union to attempt to effect a major strategic realignment in Cuba.

b. Likewise, Khrushchev undoubtedly viewed this grand strategy as a means of assuring the stability of his own power and his influence internally. Evidence of dissatisfaction within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led him to seek this redress.

c. There is some indication that political considerations prevented more intensive American reconnaissance over Cuba which might have led to an earlier disclosure of the construction of the Soviet missile sites. Recent U-2 downings sensitized US policymakers to the political repercussions of these flights. The State Department had not forgotten Khrushchev's use of a similar incident during his Paris summit with Eisenhower.

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d. The role of the United Nations in the Cuban crisis was insignificant. Decisions were presented to the world body without prior consultation. Although UN leaders participated in the resolution of the crisis, their importance in the final settlement was minimal.

e. The diplomatic and political pressures brought against the Soviet Union by US allies in Europe and Latin America simply by their support of the US position revealed another Soviet miscalculation and significantly affected the outcome of the crisis. Latin American nations offered military forces and bases to enforce the quarantine. US diplomatic action secured prohibitions which barred the African or Caribbean air routes to Cuba for Soviet planes which might carry missile parts or nuclear warheads. Had the United States been diplomatically isolated, Soviet audacity would most likely have risen.

## 10. Role of Military Power.

a. The superior military position of the United States in the Caribbean prior to the completion of the planned missile installations was well understood by the Soviet Union. The Russians calculated, however, that the United States would not react forcefully to the introduction of strategic weapons into Cuba. Soviet strategists were convinced that their secrecy and deception and the rapidity of construction would preclude any effective US response. This conclusion was strengthened by the failure of the United States to respond to the previous buildup of conventional defensive weapons systems.

b. Military calculations were very significant in Khrushchev's Cuban strategy. Its success would have meant a dramatic automatic increase in the Soviet Union's preemptive strike capability. Greater targeting flexibility and missile reliability would have resulted. The American missile warning system would have been bypassed and our primary deterrent in 1962, the US bomber force, would have been largely discredited. As a result, the entire global strategic balance of power would have been altered by decreasing the American-Soviet imbalance. Cuba would undoubtedly serve as an important base for intelligence gathering and electronic surveillance against the United States and Russian missiles could have been used to diminish US influence in the Western Hemisphere by lending credibility to Soviet boasts of nuclear superiority and to threaten the Panama Canal.

c. When the nature of the threat became clear and the decision was made by the President to use force if necessary, various tactical deployments were hurried to make US determination credible to the Soviet Union. The USSR had no real conventional military option with which to challenge the American threat once the confrontation emerged. Neither air protection nor surface and submarine escorts were available to break the US blockade. Tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba may have offered some

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defense to the island, but the massive US preparations being readied for a possible invasion gave Khrushchev clear evidence of his military inferiority in the area. Nuclear war would not have served to achieve any of his original aims and would have resulted in unacceptable losses.

#### 11. Role of Economic Power.

a. The United States utilized economic pressures to make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to supply Cuba. During September 1962, the State Department sought to persuade other Western nations to reduce or terminate shipment of supplies to Cuba. The embargo (1) denied US Government financing and cargoes to ships trading with Cuba; (2) refused the use of US port facilities to the ships of any nation carrying military supplies to the island; (3) refused entry into its ports to any ship delivering nonmilitary Communist cargoes to Cuba on the same continuous voyage; and (4) banned all American ships and American flag ships from carrying supplies of any type to or from Cuba. The embargo presented a serious challenge since most shipping to Cuba was done in non-Communist flag ships.

b. There is little indication that the embargo had any real impact on the subsequent crisis. Little was heard about it after the 22 October speech and speculation has arisen that either the United States quietly abandoned it to show gratitude for the diplomatic support extended by our allies during the crisis or else it was initially intended only to serve as a "counterdeception" which would have supported any of the flexible policies of the administration. Although it should have been a warning that it was the low risk predecessor of a more forceful policy, "the deterrent effect of the embargo was probably lost on the Soviet leadership or not fully appreciated."<sup>2</sup>

#### 12. Impact of Intelligence.

a. American intelligence supplied Washington with accurate, fairly detailed information on Soviet actions in Cuba prior to the 14 October overflight which conclusively proved the existence of Soviet offensive missile installations. The quality of the photographs proved to the world the validity of US charges. The timely discovery of the construction precluded a more serious crisis which would have been inevitable if the United States had been faced with completed bases fully protected by SAMs.

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<sup>2</sup>Walter W. Layson, The Political and Strategic Aspects of the 1961 Cuban Crisis, 1961, pp. 281-282.

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b. Intelligence analysts and decisionmakers failed, however, to accurately perceive Soviet strategy prior to the crisis. They either misunderstood or disregarded factors which might have led the Soviet Union to undertake gambles in order to improve its strategic posture. The pervasive belief that the Soviet Union would not deploy strategic weapons in Cuba caused the Administration to decline serious consideration of conflicting intelligence hypotheses.

## 13. Alternatives.

a. Six alternatives were considered as means of meeting the Soviet challenge:

(1) Do nothing. This alternative was never seriously debated. It would have meant ignoring previous pledges and commitments, destroying our future credibility, and giving the Soviet Union a great political victory in terms of the international balance of power.

(2) Protest to the United Nations or to Cuba or the Soviet Union directly. The use of diplomacy alone was rejected as being an inadequate response to the level of threat. The limitations of the United Nations were recognized by Washington as well as the fact that the many small new nations who comprised the bulk of the General Assembly membership would almost certainly oppose any action by a large nation against a smaller one. In addition, the Soviet Union had a veto and Ambassador Zorin of the Soviet Union was Chairman of the Security Council in October. Diplomatic protest was used, however, in conjunction with more direct, forceful action, to legitimize the United States position.

(3) Make "surgical" air strikes on the missile installations. Although given serious consideration, this alternative was judged unnecessarily aggressive. There could be no assurance that all sites would be destroyed. Civilians and Soviet military would undoubtedly have been killed and Russian MIGs and IL-28 bombers could have still attacked Guantanamo and the southeastern United States. Robert Kennedy, among others, saw such an action as a "Pearl Harbor in reverse" which would have harmed the moral position of the United States for decades.

(4) Invade Cuba. This option would have seriously endangered US allies in Berlin, Turkey, etc., and could possibly have led to nuclear war. It presented serious moral problems for American policymakers.

(5) Enforce a maritime blockade of all traffic entering Cuban territorial waters. This course would have unnecessarily irritated many European allies and would have been clearly illegal in terms of

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international law. It would have weakened America's moral case and would have been in opposition to previous American policy regarding freedom of the seas.

(6) Enforce a quarantine to stop only those Soviet ships delivering missiles to Cuba. This policy was accepted for several reasons:

(a) It permitted a more controlled military escalation and greater political flexibility.

(b) The burden of the next step was placed on the shoulders of Khrushchev.

(c) It represented a strong, positive action but did not preclude negotiation.

(d) It was viewed as moral and legal in terms of US national purposes and international law.

(e) It was the credible response least likely to escalate into nuclear war.

(f) A possible naval engagement in the Caribbean was viewed as the best strategic encounter in terms of US capabilities.

(g) A temporary stalemate prior to any confrontation allowed time for a buildup of conventional forces in Florida and the Southeast, thereby strengthening the US position.

(h) A blockade could be immediately implemented.

(i) The risks involved were acceptable in terms of the perceived threat.

b. Thus, the United States combined diplomatic initiatives and military threats in a strategy to force a Russian retreat. The Soviet Union, confronted with the American response, was forced to withdraw or face the unacceptable risk of nuclear war. US military superiority in the region left no other real choice.

## 14. The Decisionmaking Process.

a. The primary decisional/advisory unit during the Cuban missile crisis was the ad hoc Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOM). This group bypassed the more formal arrangements of both the Cabinet and the National Security Council.

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b. President Kennedy himself, however, retained the final decisionmaking authority and determined both membership and function within EXCOM. Although the President constantly sought to maintain channels of communication to his staff and access to diverse sources of information, counsel during the crisis was sought from a small number of advisers. The final decision to pursue a simultaneous policy of diplomacy and quarantine was made by Kennedy in the face of significant high level opposition.

c. All indications point to the fact that the Cuban adventure was primarily the result of Khrushchev's personal perceptions and strategy. He most likely personally controlled Soviet policy during the crisis but undoubtedly lost influence within the Party as a consequence of its outcome.

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CHAPTER 3 (C)

THE ENVIRONMENT OF CRISIS: THE MIDDLE EAST  
(1973) (U)

1. (C) Prior Indications of Crisis (U).

a. There were a number of conflicting signals prior to the 1973 Middle East War, as there were prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the discovery of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba, which, in retrospect, appear to be unmistakable warnings of aggression. In September, Egyptian and Syrian reconciliation with King Hussein of Jordan after nearly two years of hostility marked the initiation of a new phase of Arab rapprochement. Before meeting Hussein and President Hafez al-Assad of Syria in Cairo, President Sadat visited Saudi Arabia and Qatar, where he was assured of new assistance. The next week the Kuwaiti leader visited Cairo and offered Egypt similar promises. Reports indicate the three oil-rich nations offered to give Egypt more than \$1.5 billion to purchase modern weapons. The Arabs had begun to close the ranks against Israel.

b. King Faisal began to indicate his desire to use oil as a political weapon by freezing current production levels unless the United States showed a willingness to revise its Middle East policy and follow a more even-handed approach in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Faisal previously had been a rather conservative force in the region who was considered solidly pro-American.

c. The Syrian-Jordanian Accords allowed Syria to move a large number of her troops from the Jordanian border to the ceasefire lines along the Golan Heights. Jordanian troops likewise withdrew from the Syrian frontier to the Jordan River truce lines with Israel. These troop movements were down-played in the Israeli press and no military initiative was forecast.

d. The Egyptians moved large quantities of tanks, armored personnel, carriers, guns, and trucks to within a few miles of the canal in late September. There was little concern shown toward subsequent Egyptian troop concentrations along the Suez Canal. These movements were viewed as a part of predicted training exercises which are held annually at the same time of the year. These maneuvers were unusual, however, in that they occurred for the first time during the holy month of Ramadan. Not until the first week of October was there enough unusual activity to raise suspicions of an Arab offensive. While Israeli forces were put on alert, there was no general mobilization and no official fear that war was imminent.

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e. A predicted spring offensive by the Arabs had failed to materialize and most Israelis felt the danger had passed for the year. The indications of attack this time were clearer, however. Perhaps the strongest signal was the massive Russian airlift from Damascus and Cairo to return home virtually all Soviet military personnel from both countries. Jerusalem merely warned the United States that a major Arab attack appeared probable and asked that Cairo and Damascus be warned to desist. Israel claims to have known about the offensive several days prior to the attack but resisted the temptation to attack so the world would recognize the Arabs as aggressors. Such assured Israeli pre-cognition is open to doubt, however.

f. Few Americans predicted a renewed outbreak of fighting in the Middle East. Israeli warnings were in general dismissed as self-serving and biased. The United States apparently depends on second sources for a great deal of its intelligence in the Middle East. Such sources, although generally reliable, provide information which is difficult to analyze and assess.

2. (C) Impact of Surprise (U).

a. The primary impact of surprise in the October War was that the Israelis suffered a series of initial setbacks which were costly to reverse. Secondly, the confidence gained by the Arabs in these early victories helped eliminate some of the humiliation remaining from the June 1967 war. The attack put the Arabs at an initial strategic advantage and proved the Israelis were not immune to military defeat. The long-range impact of these psychological readjustments at future peace negotiations can not be predicted. The assumption that the Arabs would be branded as aggressors and condemned by world opinion, as a result of the surprise attack, was not realized to the degree expected by the Israelis. Perhaps this was because much of the world perceived the Arabs to be attempting to regain their own territory occupied by Israel since 1967 or because of a desire not to be the target of the new-found Arab weapon of petropolitics. In any case, many Israeli assumptions had to be reevaluated in the wake of new political and military realities.

b. The Israelis attempted to obtain world sympathy from the fact that the attack came on Yom Kippur. The impact of this timing is in dispute, however. Some argue it caught the Israelis off guard and delayed retaliation. People were mostly in synagogues or at home for the holiday. Others argue that the timing was good for the Israelis. Had the attack come on any other holiday, they would have been scattered throughout the country and there would have been considerable traffic on the roads which would have interfered with troop columns rushing to the front.

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c. For both the Israelis and the United States, the surprise resulted in a major reexamination of methods of intelligence gathering and evaluation. It served to strengthen the mistrust many US decisionmakers have felt toward military intelligence since Pearl Harbor.

3. (U) Time Constraints.

a. The time for decisionmaking in the 1973 Middle East crisis was brief. The United States had to react quickly after the initiation of hostilities to prevent the Soviet airlift from upsetting the balance of forces in the area.

b. In the later stages of the crisis, quick American reaction was required to respond to the threat of Soviet intervention. It was necessary to insure that US intentions were well understood and to avoid being confronted by a Russian fait accompli.

c. In the final stages of battle, time became more critical as arrangements for a ceasefire attempted to keep pace with a fluid military environment. The inability to identify precise positions on 22 October caused serious political problems in subsequent negotiations.

4. (C) Impact of US Interests (U).

a. The primary national interests of the United States in the Middle East at stake in the October 1973 war were the prevention of any single power or coalition of powers from gaining hegemony in the region and the maintenance of the security and independence of the state of Israel. The interest in continued access to the petroleum assets of the region did not seem as immediate and did not greatly influence the American response.

b. The United States felt that the massive Soviet airlift of arms and equipment would upset the tenuous balance which had been achieved in the region between the Arabs and the Israelis. A resupply of Israel was therefore initiated to prevent the danger of her defeat or the loss of such territories as would endanger her existence in future wars or at the peace table.

c. Soviet moral and military support of the Arab cause has greatly increased Russia's prestige and influence in the Middle East. Their stated intention to intervene directly in the fighting further posed a serious threat to US interests. President Nixon, as a result, took both diplomatic and military action to warn the Soviet Union of the consequences of intervention.

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5. (C) Impact of Adversary's Interests (U).

a. The Soviet Union has long desired to gain a foothold in the Middle East for geopolitical, military, and psychological reasons. The expansion of Russia's influence there would strengthen her position as a world power and render obsolete the old American policy of containment. Her decision to support the Arabs was based primarily on these considerations. Soviet prestige has become linked to Arab success achieved with Russian weapons.

b. Soviet global interests in detente with the West apparently predominated, however, when a direct confrontation with the United States became a danger. The USSR, recognizing there existed no serious threat to Arab territories, thus chose to accept United Nations mediation rather than pursue unilateral enforcement of a ceasefire and risk US retaliation.

6. (C) Impact of Allies' Interests (U).

a. American allies in Europe generally viewed their primary interest in the Middle East as continued access to Arab oil. They refused to cooperate with the United States, therefore, for fear that the Arab countries would cut off their oil supplies. Most Western European nations warned Washington that aircraft bound for Israel could neither land nor have rights of transit over their territories. This position was taken by Turkey despite the fact that Soviet resupply aircraft flew over Turkey without approval and without public protest.

b. The European attitude did not deter the American decision to transport needed supplies to Israel. The result, however, was that a special, improvised system had to be devised to rush supplies to the Israelis.

7. (C) Coordination with Allies (U).

a. There has been much criticism of the United States by European nations, especially France, because of the fact that events in the Middle East were controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union without consulting other interested parties. The final ceasefire was arranged primarily by the superpowers. Israel claims to have been forced by the United States to allow the shipment of provisions to the trapped Egyptian Third Army. The United States and the Soviet Union inform rather than coordinate with their respective Middle East clients when it is in their mutual interest.

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b. Reports vary concerning Arab coordination with the Soviet Union prior to the attack. Indications such as the Russian troop evacuation, however, support the contention of Russian foreknowledge. The Israelis, likewise, are usually forced to coordinate with the United States because of their dependence on American military aid.

8. (U) Impact of Public Opinion.

a. Despite minor trends to the contrary, the US public, in general, is predominantly pro-Israel. There is also great support for President Nixon's policy of detente with the Russians and keeping the great powers in control of the situation. The factors of America's influential Jewish population and our consciousness of being a nation of immigrants should not be ignored. Most important in explaining US support for Israel, however, is the American ideal of fair play and sympathy for the underdog.

b. This pro-Israel orientation probably played a substantial role in President Nixon's actions and the subsequent support shown in Congress. Even the oil industry remained fairly objective amid promises of higher prices, increased stock values and profits, and possible incentives for a renewed search for other sources of energy. This industry position allowed the voice of the American general public to be more influential.

9. (C) Role of Political Power (U).

a. During the most serious hours of the crisis, President Nixon had to force Brezhnev not to carry out a private threat. Mutual interest in the preservation of detente, after the United States displayed its determination in a show of force, allowed a peaceful resolution by political means. Even Soviet and American exchanges in the United Nations were rather restrained.

b. Summits and special emissary exchanges were utilized to maintain communication with the Soviets and both sides of the Arab-Israeli confrontation throughout the crisis. The importance of politics was best shown in the final outcome, however. Both the United States and the USSR modified their previous positions concerning Israeli withdrawal by jointly sponsoring the UN ceasefire resolution. Mutual promises to pressure their respective clients probably ended the fighting.

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c. The United States did not exercise the full potential of its political power in the Middle East prior to the crisis, however. Encouragement from the oil companies to avoid incidents and pressures from both the Arabs and the Israelis to limit reconnaissance served to restrict our political-subversive activities in the region while the reluctance of the American people to get involved in another overseas war restrained definitive commitments.

10. (C) The Role of Military Power (U).

a. President Nixon assigned an important role to military power in the resolution of the Middle East conflict by responding quickly to counter Soviet supply activities to the Arab combatants and by ordering a worldwide military alert to demonstrate US determination to oppose any unilateral Soviet intervention. Had the Russians not perceived this reaction as credible, the political resolution achieved would have been endangered.

b. The role played by military power this time, however, was comparatively less important than during the 6-Day War. The Russians, who had threatened to intervene with missiles against Israel, backed down only when President Johnson pointed the Sixth Fleet at the area of battle. This time, however, the Soviets withdrew their advisers from both Syria and Egypt prior to the fighting. In October, Russian military actions seemed more sublimated to diplomatic maneuvering.

c. The initial Arab military victories, combined with the heavy Soviet airlifts, forced the United States to react quickly in Israel's defense. The Arabs seemed to possess an unlimited supply of ammunition and their firepower was impressive. The Israelis lost many aircraft due to their failure to recognize the SA-6 threat and were forced to start a missile suppression program. The success of Egyptian commando operations was also unexpected. These Arab achievements assured Soviet diplomatic support. They forced the United States to question Israeli air superiority and invincibility.

11. (C) Role of Economic Power (U).

a. New-found Arab economic power forced European moderation and, in some cases, open support for the Arab cause. It is also probable that resource needs in the area probably resulted in some moderation on the part of the United States. Disunity in the West, however, limited the credibility of threats of possible counter-boycotts.

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b. The Arabs also used their power to coerce the Black African states that retained relations with Israel to break them. In exchange for this support the Arabs promised to use oil embargoes to support policies of the O.A.U. against South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal.

12. (C) Impact of Intelligence (U).

a. The 1973 Middle East crisis is yet another example of misinterpretation of adequate, available intelligence. Few US intelligence analysts and decisionmakers believed that the Arabs were ready to risk another war with Israel. Despite warnings and clear signals of approaching conflict, we interpreted these actions in terms of preconceived notions, experience, and expectations. The national policy of detente with the USSR and indications of developing detente between the adversaries in the Middle East made predictions of another Arab-Israeli war the subject of scorn.

b. Misperception of Allied reaction also served to embarrass American "predicters." Valuable time was lost in the resupply of Israel because improvised routes had to be developed. The use of American forces stationed in Italy, Greece, and Turkey was always considered essential to a viable US policy in support of Israel. Military planning must now be revised in light of the refusal of those nations to allow American troops and equipment stationed there to be deployed to Israel.

13. (U) Alternatives.

a. American policymakers, faced with the choice of continued aid to Israel or bowing to Arab warnings of reprisal, chose the former. To have done otherwise would have reduced the credibility of American commitments and would have opened the door to initiatives toward Soviet hegemony over the Middle East and threatened the security of the state of Israel.

b. In the face of Arab and Soviet threats the United States chose to:

(1) Match the Soviet resupply effort to the Arabs by stepping up delivery of previously ordered supplies to Israel and authorizing additional aid.

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(2) Put in force military readiness preparations to counter possible Soviet unilateral intervention, and

(3) Initiate intense political and diplomatic action on all fronts.

These actions represented the limits to which the US public and Congress would go without a more defined threat, but they served to warn the Soviet Union of American determination to protect its interests in the region.

c. The Soviet Union apparently was impressed with the sincerity of Washington's reaction and chose not to go to the "brink." The Russians valued detente with the West and were suspicious of Arab motives and loyalties. They chose, therefore, to jointly sponsor a UN-enforced ceasefire proposal.

## 14. (U) Decisionmaking.

a. US decisionmaking during the Middle East crisis appears to have been made primarily by the President. Although President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger exercised strong control over choices, the National Security Council, the Washington Special Action Group, and other similar bodies were employed to a limited degree.

b. Soviet decisionmaking does not appear to be as strongly identified with any single individual as it was during the Cuba crisis. In Israel decisionmaking was primarily the responsibility of a special "war cabinet." Arab decisionmaking was performed primarily by the individual heads of state on the basis of their own particular interests although the round of inter-Arab conferences held prior to the fighting probably was used to coordinate the attack. The Egyptians realized almost any action would improve the conditions of the current stalemate and sought to seize some territory on the east bank of the Canal or, at the least, to end the unsatisfactory stalemate by evoking great power initiatives or intervention.

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CHAPTER 4 (C)

COMMON VARIABLES IN THE CRISIS SITUATIONS (U)

1. (C) Political Variables (U).

a. Each crisis exploited extraordinary and sometimes improvised methods of communication and diplomacy.

(1) During the months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Nomura met approximately 40 to 50 times, usually at night, in Hull's apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel to try to avoid war. Despite secret Japanese pressure for a Konoye-Roosevelt meeting, however, the President followed the advice of Hull and Grew and avoided such an encounter on the basis that it would only serve to further complicate the foreign policy situation and, if unsuccessful, would further the interests of Japanese militarists who were arguing that the failure of diplomacy was inevitable.

(2) The Cuban Missile Crisis, due to improved communication, was marked by a new form of high-level, person-to-person diplomacy. President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev discussed the crisis and proposed solutions in direct exchanges. At one point in the crisis, events were occurring at such a fast pace that diplomacy was conducted via ordinary shortwave radio in order to speed the exchanges. The era of "eyeball-to-eyeball" diplomacy was initiated.

(3) "Eyeball-to-eyeball" diplomacy was combined with the extraordinary "whirlwind" diplomacy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in seeking a solution to the 1973 Middle East Crisis. While President Nixon was meeting in Washington with Egyptian and Israeli leaders, Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Sisco were hopping from capital to capital, first to Moscow and then throughout the Middle East.

b. Intra-alliance relations were harmed in all three crises because each nation pursued its own national interest first and foremost.

(1) Prior to Pearl Harbor, both the British and the Dutch became disturbed with the United States because Roosevelt consistently refused to state the conditions under which we would supply assistance if their Eastern possessions were attacked or under what circumstances we would enter the fight ourselves. At Singapore, the United States and Great Britain were unable to agree on a common strategy in the Far East because of their differing interests.

(2) The distrust which emerged prior to and during the Second World War was accentuated by later crises. Europeans felt that they were informed after the fact about decisions which threatened their very existence during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The result was a weakening of NATO and French disengagement.

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(3) Europe's fears of inferiority at being a second rate partner to the United States were further irritated by the great power pressures and agreements which resulted from the Middle East crisis. The Arab oil boycotts and "petropolitics" have further strained alliance relationships.

c. Bureaucratic problems and domestic political pressures, in each case, made the resolution of the crisis more difficult for American policymakers.

(1) Interservice rivalries and rivalries between Naval War Plans and Naval Intelligence served to block communication and perception at Pearl Harbor. There was also a concentration on Atlantic and European affairs in Washington which made comprehension of Japanese intentions, motives, and actions more difficult. Code analysts were believed to be too immersed in the "oriental point of view" to be trusted entirely.

(2) Different parts of the US Government and the intelligence community had conflicting perceptions concerning the data which warned of Japan's intentions, largely because they saw the incoming reports in very different contexts. In addition, officers in the field misunderstood the warnings from Washington because the War Department misunderstood the extent to which Pearl Harbor was assured that the most likely danger was from sabotage. Officials in Washington also were mistaken in their assumption that the Hawaiian Commanders knew the content of the secret Japanese cables available at headquarters which indicated the distinct possibility of surprise attack.

(3) Disputes and personal enmity among policymakers made decisionmaking difficult during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The role played by the upcoming Presidential election is difficult to assess, but undoubtedly restricted the freedom of movement available to the President. Kennedy was obviously concerned about opposition charges that he was soft on communism. He needed a clear political victory after the embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs defeat and the showdown with Khrushchev at Vienna.

(4) The 10-day delay between decision (4 October) and overflight (14 October) of Cuba resulted largely from squabbling among the State Department, the Air Force, and the CIA. The State Department continued to press its case concerning the dangers associated with the possible loss of a U-2 over Cuba. The Air Force, playing upon these arguments, stated that it would be better if a downed pilot were an Air Force pilot in uniform rather than a CIA agent. The CIA, on the other hand, argued this was an intelligence operation and therefore within the jurisdiction of the CIA. Apparently the CIA's U-2's had

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been modified to give them an advantage over the Air Force U-2's in averting Soviet SAM's. Eventually, Air Force pilots were trained to fly CIA U-2's and a successful overflight did take place on 14 October.

(5) Differences of opinion between State Department analysts, looking at American policy pragmatically, and the White House, under pressure from Jewish lobbying groups, detracted from a concerted consideration of the Middle East crisis. Many State Department analysts, often referred to pejoratively as the "Arabists" because of their background and leanings, found their influence diminished. Inevitable comparisons with the Cuban crisis and domestic pressures of the Watergate controversy may have constrained the exercise of policy options even further.

2. (C) Psychological Variables (U).

a. In each crisis fears of encirclement and containment influenced action and reaction.

(1) Fears of an Anglo-American policy of encirclement against Japan in the Southern Pacific Ocean appear time and time again in official Japanese documents and memoirs. Such a perceived threat, whether real or imagined, was certain to be taken seriously by an insular power such as Japan.

(2) President Kennedy felt that the Soviet Union sought to encircle the West by subverting the world's developing nations and controlling the entire southern half of the globe. Cuba, of course, was the primary Soviet base of subversion in Latin America--the area which was most critical to the United States. Perhaps American officials felt the Russians were simply reversing the old US policy of containment adopted by the State Department after the Second World War.

(3) The US policy of containment sought to weaken the Soviet's viability as a world power by preventing the expansion of Russian influence to neighboring states. Greece, Turkey, and Iran were the focal points of US efforts. Detente and increased Soviet sophistication and capabilities have allowed the Russians to leapfrog this "line of defense" and attempt to establish a power base in the Middle East. Psychologically, militarily, and geopolitically, this was a natural move.

b. Previous false alarms and alerts and a numbness from facing repeated international crises served in each case to dull reaction and to make the true nature of the crisis unrecognizable until its seriousness had escalated.

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(1) In the week prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel and his forces in Hawaii checked out seven false reports of Japanese submarines in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. They doubted chances of a Japanese attack and viewed such alarms as serious irritants to their normal pursuit of duties.

(2) Likewise, Cuban refugees had been reporting Russian missiles in Cuba for more than a year and a half prior to the first official sightings. Natural prejudices of Cuban refugee groups and lessons learned from the Bay of Pigs invasion made American analysts particularly skeptical. Domestic political tactics of exaggeration regarding the Cuban threat in order to discredit the administration were discounted by serious observers as merely self-serving. Warnings by John McCone were also suspect because of his conservative bias and the tendency of any organization such as the CIA to interpret evidence so as to justify its own existence.

(3) The Israelis had received various signals forecasting an imminent Arab attack for more than six months prior to the October War. Every time such a signal was received, the government had to make a decision on mobilization of reserves. The tenseness of the situation in general made all predicted attacks suspect to both the United States and Israel.

c. As might be expected during periods of confrontation, the role played by deception was significant in all three crises.

(1) Prior to Pearl Harbor, the Japanese imposed a radio blackout, gave shore leave to a number of Japanese sailors, issued false war plans to Japanese commanders, reinforced the northern border of Manchuria, engaged in false radio communications, and utilized other methods of deception to hide their true intentions. The success of these efforts was stunning.

(2) In Cuba the Soviets used trees, tarpaulins, camouflage nets, paint and mud to alter the natural shape of the missiles. Cubans were kept from the docks while unloading was taking place. All movements occurred at night. As late as September the Soviet Union continued to insist that she had no real need for offensive bases in Cuba since her nuclear arsenal possessed sufficient forces to destroy any foe. They expected that the publicized defensive buildup would serve to shroud the introduction of strategic weapons into the Caribbean.

(3) Prior to the latest outbreak of fighting, President Sadat of Egypt seemed to have embarked upon a new campaign of moderation. Soviet advisers were expelled, the Egyptian-Libyan unification proposal abandoned, and new diplomatic initiatives were begun with Saudi Arabia and Jordan. A major policy speech by Sadat suggested surprising

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moderation toward the United States, and a US firm, the Bechtel Corporation, was awarded the concession to build the new "Suez to the Mediterranean" oil pipeline. This \$354,400,000 agreement was the first major cooperative effort with the United States since Aswan Dam days. Significant indications had been received by Secretary of State Kissinger that the Arabs were ready to negotiate. The Egyptians used sand colored netting to hide their equipment from Israeli aircraft and observation posts on the east bank of the Suez Canal in an additional attempt to hide their aggressive plans.

d. During each crisis, there was a tendency to keep important "signals" and policy decisions from ourselves as well as the enemy.

(1) The MAGIC (decoded Japanese diplomatic cables), the Kennedy-Khrushchev communications, and the Nixon-Breshnev exchanges were closely guarded during the crises. While it is recognized that such sources must necessarily be read and interpreted swiftly, perhaps examination and comment by a wider range of experts might have proven beneficial.

(2) In each case, high level committees were directly supervising decisions and doing paperwork normally delegated to their lower level commands and staffs. In the case of Cuba, a credible argument can be made that the delay in analyzing the "thousands of pictures" was partially a result of the stringent secrecy imposed on all information concerning the missiles.

e. In addition to the tendency to restrict access to raw data, decisionmaking in the three crises was also conducted primarily in secret. Charges were made in each case that US leadership withheld information from the US public in a campaign of secrecy and deception until the crisis reached a climax.

(1) Roosevelt was unsure of the reaction of the US public to war and sought to avoid the issue as long as possible. The Americans realized that events were becoming more serious, but this was only a vague impression before Pearl Harbor.

(2) During the Cuban crisis the public began to reexamine Senator Keating's explicit early warnings that Soviet long- and medium-range missiles and combat troops were in Cuba. In the days before the crisis, President Kennedy continued to campaign on schedule in the Middle West. On 21 October, the Defense Department denied that the large concentration of military forces off Puerto Rico was linked with a crisis.

(3) Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated in his news conference of 25 October that the complete extent of Russian threat could not be revealed, but promised to disclose the full details at some later date. The press and the American public began to surmise that the crisis

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might be politically inspired due to President Nixon's domestic troubles. Full details of the diplomatic exchanges will probably be withheld for years.

f. In each crisis, despite evidence to the contrary, the United States continued to see what it wanted to see.

(1) Political science research, largely quantitative, has proven the operability of this tendency in crisis situations. In all three cases, the United States tended to downplay the seriousness of the situation in the interests of detente until overt action was taken by the aggressor.

(2) Roosevelt issued directives to avoid incidents with the Japanese at all costs. He did not want a two-front war and refused to accept it as a possibility for a long time. Likewise, in Cuba and the Middle East, the United States did not want to accept the actions they saw being taken by the Russians and the Arabs. Under such conditions, the tendency is great to ignore small bits of information which, when combined and tested in a conceptual framework, may prove significant. As Wohlstetter has pointed out in the case of Pearl Harbor, these three crises each show "how hard it is to hear a signal against the prevailing noise, in particular when you are listening for the wrong signal, and even when you have a wealth of information."<sup>1</sup>

g. The role of bad luck and chance, though difficult to assess, played an important part in each crisis.

(1) It has been said that in foreign affairs, preparation, judgment, and experience are important, but luck is essential. Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the United States, to avoid any incidents, took the precaution of stopping all traffic on the northwest passage to Russia. This made visual observation of the Pearl Harbor task force impossible. The 7 December Hawaiian radio blackout and the use of commercial wire for the last alert message rather than the scrambler telephone may be ascribed to bad luck.

(2) In Cuba, a number of critical U-2 flights, particularly in the period 17-26 September, were cancelled because of bad weather forecasts. The fact that the crisis and its preceding events occurred during the hurricane season made intelligence all the more difficult.

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<sup>1</sup>Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, Jul 1965, p. 691.

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(3) The fact that the Chinese had downed a U-2 plane on 9 September also made US decisionmaking during the Cuban Missile Crisis more difficult. The US intelligence community remembered all too well the political explosion surrounding the Soviet downing of an American U-2 flight on 1 May 1960. They feared additional publicity would lead to world outcries which would force the abandonment of future U-2 flights. This would mean the loss of their most reliable source of information. Based primarily on State Department fears of more political incidents, it was decided that the practice of flying up one side of Cuba and down the other would be replaced by a policy of more peripheral observation.

(4) The fact that the United States found itself faced with a serious fuel crisis even before the October War gave US decisionmakers additional incentives to encourage moderation and compromise. The timing of certain events preceding the crisis which have been interpreted by the West as Arab deception may better be described as luck.

h. Perhaps most important of all the common variables is the role played by "behavioral surprise" or "apparent behavioral surprise" in each of these three situations.

(1) Research in decisionmaking theory and crisis diplomacy during recent years has made great strides toward explaining strategic surprise. Ole R. Holsti developed the following hypothesis from his study of Dulles: "Individuals tend to assimilate new perceptions into a body of familiar ones and to interpret what is seen in such a way as to minimize the clash with previous expectations."<sup>2</sup>

(2) Klaus Knorr has developed a similar theme in his concepts of "technical surprise" and "behavioral surprise." "Technical surprise" is defined as "one not incompatible with the prevalent set of expectations. It occurs because the opponent was successful in concealing a particular capability." "Behavioral surprise," on the other hand, "occurs when the opponent's behavior is incompatible, or seems to be incompatible, with our set of expectations." "Behavioral surprise" occurs when (a) the opponent acts highly irrationally or with unexpected irrationality, (b) when intelligence is based more on stereotypes than objective perceptions, and (c) when an opponent's

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<sup>2</sup>Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia" in Enemies in Politics, 1967, ed. by Daniel J. Finley, p. 30.

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behavior is altered due to leadership or other important changes and our expectations, though previously correct, do not recognize the shift.<sup>3</sup> Another condition which might also be added to Knorr's definition is a case in which an opponent acts with unexpected rationality.

(3) The strategic surprises encountered at Pearl Harbor, in Cuba, and in the Middle East may be interpreted in terms of "behavioral surprise" or "apparent behavioral surprise." By late November 1941, US policymakers had a firm conception of Japanese military plans. The US War Council concluded on 25 November that "The Japanese attack would fall on Siam, Malaya or the Dutch East Indies rather than the Philippines."<sup>4</sup> American policymakers felt that (a) Pearl Harbor was more of a deterrent than a target, (b) the Japanese had a clearly drawn up strategy which would have precluded an attack on the United States, and (c) Japan would attack the British first.<sup>5</sup> Evidence to the contrary given by an Army Intelligence report in the fall of 1941 was dismissed by policymakers. Such a bold move by the Japanese was regarded as too radical a departure from normal behavior to be taken seriously.

(4) Installation of offensive missiles in Cuba by the Soviet Union was likewise considered irrational and improbable. The Stennis Report on the crisis attributed the failure to predict Russia's moves to certain "preconceptions" of the intelligence community. A "substantial error" was noted in "the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles in Cuba."<sup>6</sup> Certainly Kennedy expected the Soviet Union to attempt subversion rather than direct confrontation.

(5) Knorr sees the Cuban case as an example of "apparent behavioral surprise." He argues that the dominant set of expectations was sophisticated and realistic and that the central assumption that Russia was unlikely to initiate a move involving high risk of strategic

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<sup>3</sup>Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles," World Politics, Vol. XVI, Apr 1964, pp. 462-463.

<sup>4</sup>Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor--Warning and Decision, 1962, p. 251.

<sup>5</sup>Richard G. Trotter, The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Policy Formulation in Terms of Current Decision Making Theory, 1971, p. 393.

<sup>6</sup>US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Investigation of the Preparedness Program, Interim Report on Cuban Military Buildup, 1961, p. 3.

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confrontation was borne out by the cautious Soviet reaction to American demands. Thus, "the USSR adopted a course of action that seemed to be in conflict with our set of basic expectations about Soviet behavior, but actually was not."<sup>7</sup> Moscow's surprise at the American reaction indicates a failure of Soviet intelligence. US intelligence failed to surmise Russia's conclusions.

(6) The role of behavioral surprise is also important in the 1973 Middle East crisis. The Arabs were badly defeated in June 1967 and the United States and Israeli intelligence were convinced that no new attack would be launched in the near future. Stereotypes against the Arabs also led to mistaken conclusions about Egyptian fighting ability and the willingness of the Soviet Union to aid them. Three categories of behavioral surprise emerge from the crisis:

(a) The individual Arab soldier was widely believed to be the weak link in the military organization. Politically, US and Israeli planners perceived Arab weaknesses as a result of their previous inability to coordinate among themselves.

(b) Secondly, although we had fairly accurate information on Arab equipment, we were surprised at their ability to use it.

(c) Finally, we were blinded by a belief in Israeli invincibility. We felt the Arabs recognized this fact and would defer any future adventures until they were in a stronger position militarily.

(7) Without a sound understanding of motivation and strategy, even the most accurate intelligence data on industrial capacity, economic development, technological advances, and military arsenals is useless. In all three crises, analysts and policymakers misread both the intentions of the adversary and his willingness to take risks.

### 3. (C) Military Variables. (U)

a. The role of delay in gathering, decoding, transmission, evaluation, and action was important in all three crises under consideration.

(1) At Pearl Harbor, delays of up to 54 days were reported in decoding of Japanese diplomatic messages. Of course, the delay in the final warning message sent by commercial wire rather than by scrambler telephone is infamous.

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<sup>7</sup>Trotter, pp. 463-464.

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(2) Similar delays were reported in connection with the Cuban crisis, especially in the identification of surface-to-air missiles. Although visual observation reported missiles as early as 29 July, overflight was delayed for one month. A flight on 14 October produced the first evidence of medium-range missiles. Likewise, Navy photographs of crates containing IL-28 bombers taken on 28 September were not evaluated until 9 October.

(3) One of the key elements in Khrushchev's strategy was to assure that antiaircraft rockets were capable of shooting down U-2's before any missiles were in place. Delays occurred which prevented the achievement of this objective. Although a U-2 was downed on 27 October, the Soviet plot had been discovered two weeks previously.

(4) In the Middle East criticism has been directed at the government of Mrs. Meir on the basis that delays in response to the Arab threat resulted in increased Israeli casualties. The effect of delays in the American resupply efforts was significant due to European policies forbidding the use of their territories in such efforts.

b. Surprise resulting from unexpected technological, tactical, and logistical capabilities contributed significantly to the confusion which resulted after the initiation of each crisis.

(1) At Pearl Harbor we failed to realize that the Japanese had been able to put fins on their torpedoes, thus making attack in shallow harbors feasible. We also failed to discover that the radius of the Japanese Zero fighter plane had been extended to 500 miles and underestimated Japanese capabilities in terms of pilot training, radar, and the capacity of Japanese aircraft carriers.

(2) The greatest military surprise the United States encountered in Cuba was the unexpected capability of the Soviets to establish missile sites at such a rapid pace. This realization had a significant impact upon subsequent decisionmaking.

(3) The effective Egyptian use of the SA-6 and other Soviet weapons was a surprise of comparable significance. We were also impressed with Arab firepower and their seemingly unlimited supply of ammunition. Egyptian jamming and ECM and their nighttime and commando skills were also impressive. Surprises in tactics and toughness enabled Arab forces to make their initial gains. The use of high pressure jets of water to remove the walls of sand which line the banks of the Suez Canal, for example, allowed tanks to penetrate the second Israeli defense line. Massive armor and artillery rather than tactical innovation, however, was responsible for the initial Syrian successes in the Golan Heights. Both the United States and the Israelis underestimated Arab capabilities.

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4. (C) Economic Variables. (U)

a. The theme of oil, embargoes and economic pressure is relevant to the crises under consideration.

(1) The Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor, as has been shown, was directly influenced by increasingly stringent American embargoes of petroleum products, scrap iron, and other resources vital to Japan's economic growth. With these vital supplies halted, Japan was forced to look southward. Since time was on the side of the United States, pressures mounted for war before the oil gauges dropped even further. Although the aim of the US-British-Dutch boycotts of Japanese goods and embargoes of vital resources were aimed at forcing a change in Japanese policies, they had the effect of challenging Japan to regain her honor and economic self-sufficiency in whatever manner necessary.

(2) It may be argued that US use of a comparable boycott aimed at Cuba prior to the crisis had a similar effect. It served to evoke a challenge to Fidel Castro and to insure that he would be forced to accept total dependence on the Soviet Union.

(3) The United States is in a distinctly different position in the Middle East. This time petropolitics is being used by the Arab nations against the West. We miscalculated the ability and determination of the Arabs to carry out their threats. It is too early yet to determine the final outcome, but initial US reaction indicates that the embargo will be viewed as a challenge and few, if any, alterations in America's pro-Israel policy will result.

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CHAPTER 5 (C)

LESSONS LEARNED (U)

1. (C) In applying the "lessons learned" from an analysis of these three crises, we must be extremely careful not to verify Santayana's maxim--"Those who remember the past are condemned to make the opposite mistakes." In future crises, historical analogies should preferably follow rather than precede a careful analysis of the situation. This is particularly true in a young nation such as the United States with a relatively short history in international politics and a tendency to be influenced largely by the relatively few international events which have threatened its vital interests.

2. (C) The following conclusions appear valid, but should be repeatedly tested against the environment, actions, and outcomes of other past and future crises:

a. Political lessons.

(1) The advantage falls to the actor initiating the surprise aggression in diplomacy as well as in military strategy. The timing of initial use of force is primary.

(2) No "ultimate" intelligence resource--"MAGIC," the U-2, or satellite reconnaissance, is useful without sound political and behavioral analysis. Conf

(3) In times of crisis, intra-alliance communication is subordinated to the national interest. The cost is high in terms of alliance unity, trust, and effectiveness.

(4) The importance of allies and alliances in times of crisis may be a significant but not the dominant consideration affecting decisions.

(5) Direct and constant communication between national leaders during times of crisis reduces the potential for war.

(6) Ad hoc foreign policy decisionmaking is common during periods of crisis. In such situations, the power of the President generally predominates over Congress. Formation of key groups and consolidation of decisionmaking in the hands of a few individuals is required to escape bureaucratic formalities and bottlenecks.

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(7) The tendency to ignore expertise at lower levels in the government during periods of crisis should be avoided in order to improve analysis. In attempting to keep information from our adversaries we should not also isolate ourselves.

(8) Reputation and experience of decisionmakers and government officials can be determining factors in the conduct of crisis diplomacy.

(9) The tendency toward overspecialization among intelligence analysts should be avoided. This is particularly true of civilian analysts who have dealt exclusively with one country or region for many years and find it difficult to predict unusual or changing behavior which does not fit a traditional pattern.

(10) There is a great need for long-range planning. Such planning allows decisionmakers to perceive more options. It allows time for choice and commitment. If the choice proves wrong, there is time to rectify mistakes.

(11) Flexibility is maximized by announcing a credible, limited objective with regard to the desired resolution of the crisis and employing a graduated, proportional response to achieve it.

(12) The importance of on-the-ground intelligence should not be ignored.

b. Psychological lessons.

(1) It is not often easy to discern the reasons for strategic surprise. We must therefore learn to live with uncertainty.

(2) It is probably better to be uncertain of enemy intentions rather than to be too certain of them.

(3) There is a tendency to interpret facts in terms of preconceived ideas and impressions (see figure 5-1).

(4) Crises do not often develop at the time and in the form anticipated by the "experts."

(5) A sudden or unexpected recently shared interest with other actors leads to a tendency to overestimate the degree of actual common interest.

(6) Certain factors may generally be expected in crisis situations--surprise, deception, and careful timing.

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	PEARL HARBOR ATTACK	CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS	1973 MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
<u>PERCEPTION</u>	US felt Japanese would not attack US directly. Many felt character of Japanese precluded surprise attack. Attack on British was predicted. Japanese felt democracies were weak and would not persevere.	US felt it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because of detente, a strategy of subversion rather than confrontation, and the fact that they had never put them in a satellite country before. The Soviets thought Kennedy was weak and would back down from a <u>fait accompli</u> .	US felt Israeli military superiority would preclude another Arab attack in the near future. There were signs that the Arabs were initiating a new era of moderation and that Soviet willingness to respond to Arab military needs was deceiving.
<u>REALITY</u>	US-British-Dutch economic boycott, time factors, and strategic considerations made attack on US the chosen Japanese alternative.	Soviets saw opportunity to alter worldwide strategic balance of power. US viewed Soviet action as a direct military threat which must be dealt with firmly.	Arab attack showed new military capabilities and a new degree of coordination. Soviet assistance was significant, even to the point of offering troops to enforce a ceasefire.
<u>DECISION</u>	The Japanese decided to launch a surprise attack on Hawaii to strike a blow at US offensive capabilities in the Pacific. The immediate US response was military retaliation.	US decided to pursue double course: diplomatic initiatives and quarantine on shipment of offensive military supplies to Cuba. The Soviets, at a strategic disadvantage, chose to avoid military confrontation.	US decided to supply Israel with needed weapons and to oppose great power intervention in the area.
<u>OUTCOME</u>	Diplomacy failed to prevent war. Peace was not restored until the military defeat of Japan.	US forced Soviet Union to withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba. Diplomacy was successful in preventing war.	Arabs gained a psychological victory; US forced Soviet Union to back down on threat to intervene; precarious ceasefire reinstated.
<u>ANALYSIS</u>	US misperceived Japanese intentions and capabilities. Japanese misperceived US psychological strength.	US misperceived Soviet intentions and capabilities. USSR misperceived US response.	US misperceived Arab intentions and capabilities and Soviet response.

Figure 5-1 (C). Analysis in Terms of "Behavioral Surprise." (U)

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c. Military lessons.

(1) Strategic warning is precarious. The chances and consequences of misperception and erroneous information and the limited time for analysis make nuclear retaliation very dangerous if based solely on advance strategic warning.

(2) Military action should avoid unnecessarily motivating an adversary to escalate in order to compensate for perceived political damage or to "save face."

(3) Military operations and strategy should be structured so as to provide opportunities for graduated options clearly identifiable to an opponent. Actions should be avoided which might be incorrectly interpreted as a precursor to large-scale warfare. Restraint and limited use of force, requisites of a measured response, should be valued.

(4) Military strategy should be coordinated and coupled with a complementary political, diplomatic, and economic strategy in an overall plan to achieve a limitation of crisis escalation.

(5) The requirement for quick action to meet sudden danger is necessary to gain time, develop options, and retain the flexibility to utilize or cope with further pressures.

(6) Military actions should clearly demonstrate US resolution to achieve whatever specific objective the President has chosen. If these actions are ambiguous, the adversary may conclude that the United States is seeking objectives more ambitious than those stated or that there is a willingness to accept much less than demanded.

(7) A credible strategic deterrent is necessary if any superpower expects to exact improvement in its international political position under risk-taking situations against another superpower.

(8) The necessity of maintaining forward deployed forces and strategic mobility remains essential to the protection of military power.

d. Economic lessons.

(1) Economic embargoes, though of increasing importance, are seldom successful and frequently counterproductive.

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(2) The importance of economic interdependence is demonstrated during periods of crisis.

3. (C) One conclusion which may seem obvious should not be made--that Soviet pressure should be countered wherever it is met by approaching the brink of war and staring the Russians down. In Cuba, and to a lesser degree in the Middle East, the United States held certain advantages. This will undoubtedly not be true in all future crises, and the decision concerning the most appropriate action should be based upon each peculiar situation and the relative merits of the alternatives as they exist at that time. Perhaps the most important lesson that can be learned is that potential adversaries must be made aware of US bureaucratic and public will and determination through the maintenance of a flexible military force and the education of an informed, aware, and vocal citizenry. Diplomatic bluffs, official secrecy, and public silence invite strategic challenge.

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CHAPTER 6 (C)

DISCERNIBLE INTERNATIONAL TRENDS (U)

1. (C) The analysis of these three crises points to an increasingly important role for international diplomacy in future crises. The new emphasis on skilled statecraft has been precipitated by greater high level, personal diplomacy, the advent of the "hot line" and improved methods of communication, and the extraordinary and improvised techniques of diplomacy exercised by Henry Kissinger.
2. (C) The great powers continue to show an increased understanding and sophistication in the handling of crises.
3. (C) There appears to be a continuing distrust of military intelligence by political decisionmakers despite increasing dependence on intelligence estimates in selecting and implementing foreign policy.
4. (C) There is also a tendency for great power rivalries to be played out by proxy. The dangers of direct confrontation in a nuclear age are well recognized.
5. (C) The strength of the current Soviet-American detente appears to be capable of weathering serious crises. Both the United States and the USSR appear to be learning that they have more to gain by cooperation than by confrontation.
6. (C) Economic diplomacy, boycotts, and embargoes are becoming increasingly accepted tools of crisis management. This appears to be true despite past failures of these techniques and the tendency to evoke a reaction opposite from that intended.
7. (C) Political, economic, and military interdependence among nation-states is increasing.

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CHAPTER 7 (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

1. (C) As Roberta Wohlstetter has written in her works on crisis comparison, "there is a difference . . . between having a signal available somewhere in the heap of irrelevancies, and perceiving it as a warning; and there is also a difference between perceiving it as a warning, and acting or getting action on it."<sup>1</sup> Strategic warning of nuclear attack is much more difficult than receiving warning at Pearl Harbor. Time and chances of survival are much less and the decision to make a preemptive strike would be much more difficult. Better analysis of enemy intentions as well as capabilities is thus necessary in order to avoid future "behavioral surprises."

2. (C) Strategic surprise short of nuclear attack, as experienced in Cuba and the Middle East, will undoubtedly occur in the future. We must be able to assemble seemingly irrelevant lists of intelligence within a viable conceptual framework, and to act decisively to avoid escalation or to counter certain attack. Whether future threats involve nuclear destruction, limited conventional war, or merely confrontation and bluff, certain actions will be required:

a. There is a need to acquire greater diversity of viewpoints in the intelligence community and to encourage intellectual debate with nongovernmental scholars and specialists. Facts which seem to contradict "official intelligence policy" or "higher documents" should not automatically be dismissed or suppressed. The greatest danger to the effectiveness and utility of military planning documents is their tendency to inbreed. Related to this is the necessity of developing broader frames of reference, perhaps conflicting, in which to assemble, reassemble, and discard individual, unrelated bits of intelligence and in which to challenge the conventional wisdom (see figures 7-1 and 7-2).

b. While experience and some degree of specialization is essential, overspecialization in strategic intelligence should be avoided to reduce the tendency for "behavioral surprise."

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<sup>1</sup>Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor--Warning and Decision, 1962, p. 389.

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An analyst who has seen the Soviet Union act a particular way time and again will find it difficult if not impossible to perceive the unexpected. Frequent rotations of duty and diversification of training should therefore be encouraged. This is particularly important for civilian personnel who may not have the enforced mobility of their military counterparts.

c. Personal and improvised methods of diplomacy and strategy formulation should be utilized to the greatest extent practicable.

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d. The information received from high-level overflights and satellite reconnaissance has been extremely valuable in collecting hard military intelligence. Although this information is basically correct and complete, it is frequently difficult to analyze. It does not adequately inform decisionmakers of enemy strategy, perceptions, and intentions. Such data can only be collected by traditional covert methods. Data collected in this manner is particularly relevant to probable future crises which will involve proxies, which will be played out in precise, defined limits, and which will, during the period of detente, involve personalized, high-level diplomacy rather than unlimited military conflict. Dependence on second sources and the information provided by the agencies of friendly governments may be useful but problems of context, bias, and special interest make analysis difficult. In such an environment, additional emphasis should be given to on the ground cloak and dagger intelligence gathering activities.

e. Renewed emphasis should be given to the development of additional strategic airlift capabilities and troop mobility. These capabilities are essential to the maintenance of a credible deterrent and the ability to exercise graduated responses.


f. Interdependence and the increasing importance of embargoes in diplomacy dictate that a major analysis should be made to determine US dependency on foreign sources of vital raw materials and the potential for conflict, shortages, and blackmail. Some preliminary work in the direction is currently being undertaken at the USAWCSSI. A major effort should then be undertaken to develop substitutes for those endangered products or to develop the capability for synthetic manufacture to satisfy future military requirements. This was done with rubber after the Japanese aggression and important new fuel substitutes will undoubtedly result from the latest Middle East crisis. Anticipation of future needs and a major research and development program could give the United States a significant strategic advantage in future crises as well as perform a major scientific and economic service for the nation and the world.

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
7-3

Figure 7-1 (U). Strategic Evaluation: Pearl Harbor, Cuba, and the Middle East



Intelligence processed and evaluated within framework of stereotypes and preconceived notions.

Figure 7-2 (U). Model for Future Strategic Evaluation.



Intelligence processed and evaluated independently of stereotypes and preconceptions by testing against conflicting conclusions.

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g. Enhanced capabilities should be given to the Political-Military Games Division of SAGA, OJCS. This would serve to increase training for leaders at the highest levels of government in the delicate art of crisis management and would perhaps increase the potential recognition of signals to head off future crises.

h. Since misperception of US will is often a result of a lack of public awareness, increased attention should be given to avoiding unnecessary classification and official secrecy.

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## APPENDIX A (U)

### CHRONOLOGY--PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (1941)

- 27 Jan--The US Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, obtained information from the Peruvian Ambassador in Tokyo and from several Japanese sources that Japan was planning a possible surprise attack on Pearl Harbor employing all of her strength and equipment in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan. Grew relayed the report to Washington but discounted its validity.
- 1 Feb--The new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, arrived in Washington to conduct conferences with US Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
- 9 Apr--Ambassador Nomura presented the first of several proposals (through 20 November 1941) seeking settlement of US-Japanese differences.
- 13 Apr--Japan signed a neutrality treaty with Russia. This meant Japan would look southward.
- 27 May--President Roosevelt proclaimed an unlimited national emergency.
- 2 Jul--Japan drafted 1,000,000 additional men.
- 18 Jul--A new Japanese cabinet was formed. Foreign Minister Matsuoka was replaced by Admiral Toyoda, expected to be friendlier to the United States.
- 24 Jul--Japanese troops occupied southern Indochina with the consent of the Vichy French.
- 26 Jul--Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the United States, closed all US ports to Japanese vessels, and proclaimed a strict embargo on the sale of US petroleum products to Japan. Japan was thus forced to accept American demands for withdrawal from China and Indochina or obtain raw materials elsewhere.
- 6 Aug--Ambassador Nomura presented a proposal in which Japan agreed to make no advances beyond Indochina and to evacuate China as soon as the dispute there was terminated. The United States, however, had to restore free trade with Japan, discontinue aid to China, press the Chinese to accept a treaty favorable to Japan, and recognize Japan's special interests in Indochina.

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- 17 Aug--Roosevelt rejected Prime Minister Konoye's proposal for a summit meeting by insisting that agreement on fundamental principles first be reached at the ambassadorial level.
- 6 Sep--The Japanese Imperial Conference, in a meeting with Emperor Hirohito, decided on war if agreement with the United States was not reached by early October.
- 24 Sep--A message was intercepted from Tokyo directing the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu to report on US naval vessels in Pearl Harbor according to a stipulated grid.
- 16 Oct--General Hideki Tojo became Prime Minister of Japan and a new, militant cabinet was formed. Konoye was forced to resign because of his suggestion that Japan compromise with the United States.
- Admiral Stark, US Chief of Naval Operations, warned Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet (CINCUS), and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC)) that Japanese aggression was likely and ordered "preparatory deployments."
- 3 Nov--Ambassador Grew cabled Washington that "action by Japan which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness."
- 5 Nov--The Japanese Naval High Command issued detailed plans and orders for the Pearl Harbor Striking Force. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had been in charge of the preparation of these plans since he conceived the attack in January 1941.
- 14-15 Nov--A Japanese task force assembled in northern Japan.
- 15 Nov--Upon the request of Ambassador Nomura, Japanese Ambassador Saburo Kuruu arrived in Washington to assist in negotiations with the United States.
- 17 Nov--Ambassador Grew again warned Washington that Japan might strike suddenly in any direction and at any time.
- 20 Nov--The "final" Japanese proposal was presented by Nomura and Kuruu.
- 22 Nov--The United States intercepted a message that the 25 November deadline would be extended until 29 November, but no longer.
- 24 Nov--The Chief of Naval Operations warned Kimmel that a "surprise aggressive movement" in any direction by Japan was a possibility.

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- 25-26 Nov--The Pearl Harbor Striking Force left the Kurile Islands under radio silence for a launching point north of Oahu. Washington received word that a fleet of 30 to 50 Japanese ships transporting five divisions of troops had been sighted off Formosa.
- 26 Nov--The United States presented the Ten Point Note to Japan in answer to the 20 November proposal.
- 27 Nov--The Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations opposed issuing an ultimatum to Japan so that time could be gained for further military preparations. Hull informed War Secretary Stimson that negotiations had probably ended.
- Roosevelt directed notification of Hawaiian commanders that negotiations with Japan had virtually collapsed and that further Japanese aggression was possible.
- 28 Nov--The United States intercepted a Japanese message instructing Nomura and Kurusu that they should not infer negotiations had been broken off despite the officially recognized inevitability.
- 1 Dec--The Pearl Harbor strike was authorized by the Japanese Privy Council in the presence of the Emperor.
- 3 Dec--Navy Intelligence reported Japanese codes being destroyed throughout the Far East.
- 6 Dec--The United States intercepted a message from Japanese agents in Honolulu which reported "there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places" (Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, Ford Island).
- Roosevelt had decoded versions of the first thirteen parts of the Japanese 14-Part Message which the Japanese Ambassadors were instructed not to deliver until a time to be expressly stipulated by Tokyo. Roosevelt stated: "This means war!"
- 7 Dec--0920 EST: The USS CONDOR sighted the periscope of a submerged submarine just outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor.
- 1100 EST: The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations received a decryption of the fourteenth part of the Japanese 14-Part Message with the direction from Tokyo that it be delivered at 1:00 pm.
- 1215 EST: The USS WARD sunk a Japanese submarine outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor.
- 1218 EST: The Chief of Staff sent a warning message to the CG, Hawaiian Department, informing him of the time specified for delivery of the 14-Part Message. The warning was received after the attack.

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7 Dec--1325-1355 EST: Japanese planes and dive bombers attacked ships in Pearl Harbor.

--1332 EST: Wheeler Field was attacked.

--1420 EST: Nomura and Kurusu delivered the 14-Part Message replying to the US proposal of 26 November.

--1600 EST: Japan declared war on the United States and Britain.

--Japan launched a surprise attack on the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Malaya.

8 Dec--The US Congress declared war on Japan.

11 Dec--Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.

9-14 Dec--Secretary of the Navy Knox visited Hawaii to assess damages.

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## APPENDIX B (U)

### CHRONOLOGY--CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1962)

- 29 Jul- 5 Aug--Cuban refugees noted an "unusual number" of ships unloading cargo and passengers at the ports of Havana and Mariel.
- 14 Aug--Refugee reports reached US intelligence agencies.
- 15 Aug--US intelligence agencies requested U-2 photo coverage of the suspected areas.
- 29 Aug--U-2 flights were made over the designated areas of Cuba and the first SAMs were identified.
- 28 Sep--Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev announced that an American attack on Cuba would mean war with the Soviet Union.
- 4 Oct--The United States announced an embargo to minimize Western shipping to Cuba. The plan (1) denied US Government financing and cargoes to foreign shipowners trading with Cuba, (2) refused port facilities to the ships of any nation transporting military supplies to Cuba, (3) barred entry to US ports to any ship which delivered non-military Communist cargoes to Cuba on the same continuous voyage, and (4) banned US ships or US flag ships from carrying cargo of any type to or from Cuba.
- 8 Oct--Congress acted to withhold economic and military assistance from any country which "sells, furnishes, or permits any ships under its registry" to trade with Cuba "so long as it is governed by the Castro regime."
- 14 Oct--A U-2 overflight detected the first reliable evidence of "offensive" medium-range Soviet missiles on the island.
- 16 Oct--CIA experts presented U-2 photographs, charts, and explanations to a selected group of US top officials. These officials were stunned since Soviet leaders, publicly and privately, had offered assurances for weeks that no missiles would go to Cuba.

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- 18 Oct--The JCS and Dean Acheson called for immediate military action.
- 19 Oct--President Kennedy continued campaigning in the Midwest on schedule to hide the crisis.
- 20 Oct--At a 1430 meeting of the full National Security Council, McNamara argued for blockade while the others favored attack. One member of the JCS favored the use of nuclear weapons. By 1710, the President had decided on blockade.
- Military preparations were advancing:
- . Missile crews were on full alert.
  - . Ground troops were moved into Florida and other Southeastern States.
  - . The First Armored Division had begun to move from Texas to Georgia.
  - . Five other divisions were put on alert.
  - . Reinforcements were flown to Guantanamo.
  - . The Navy sent 180 vessels to the Caribbean area.
  - . The Strategic Air Command dispersed bombers to scattered civilian airports.
  - . B-52s were kept aloft constantly--fully loaded with nuclear weapons.
- 22 Oct--Congressional leaders and ambassadors from 46 pro-Western and neutral nations were given advance briefings on the crisis.
- Secretary of State Dean Rusk met with the Soviet Ambassador and gave him an advance copy of President Kennedy's planned address to the nation.
- President Kennedy addressed the nation on the discovery of "offensive" military weapons in Cuba.
- UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson requested an immediate Security Council meeting to discuss the crisis.
- Secretary Rusk called for an emergency meeting of the Council of the OAS.
- The Department of Defense put all US military forces throughout the world on alert.

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23 Oct--President Kennedy announced a "quarantine" around Cuba to interdict offensive weapons.

--Soviet submarines were reportedly moving into the Caribbean.

--A number of US reserve units were mobilized. All Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were put on alert.

--Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson flew to Paris to brief NATO officials on the Cuban crisis.

--In a television address, Premier Castro denied Soviet military equipment in Cuba was "offensive."

--The Cuban military and the civilian population were placed under full mobilization.

24 Oct--The Cuban blockade went into effect at 1000 EST.

25 Oct--The Soviet oil tanker Bucharest was intercepted and allowed to proceed with only along-side visual observation after declaring she carried no cargo but petroleum. Twelve other Soviet ships reportedly altered course.

--UN Soviet Ambassador Zorin charged US photographs were false and stated that the Soviet Union had no offensive weapons stationed outside the USSR.

--A White House press release reported new intelligence data showing that the Soviet missile buildup was continuing at a rapid pace.

26 Oct--The Marcula, a US-built, Panamanian-owned, Lebanese-registered ship under Soviet charter was stopped and boarded. Since this was not a Soviet ship, it did not force the Russians to react in anger.

--The President ordered the State Department to devise plans for a civil occupation government in Cuba.

--A letter from Khrushchev indicated removal of the missiles might be arranged if the blockade were lifted and the United States assured there would be no Cuban invasion.

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27 Oct--Khrushchev proposed a swap of Cuban bases for NATO bases in Turkey. President Kennedy indicated this was unacceptable. This letter was much more ominous than the one received the previous day since it seemed to threaten a Russian invasion of Turkey if the United States attacked Cuba.

28 Oct--Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles "under adequate supervision and inspection." The US naval blockade and aerial surveillance was temporarily suspended while U Thant discussed with Castro supervision of dismantling of the Soviet missile bases.

1 Nov--The United States resumed its blockade and aerial surveillance after the proposal for a UN observer corps in Cuba had apparently failed to win Castro's approval. Subsequently, the Soviet Union proposed that a Red Cross group, or observers from the diplomatic corps in Cuba, might be used to supervise the dismantling and return of the missiles to the Soviet Union.

2 Nov--Castro rejected any form of international inspection in Cuba.

7 Nov--The United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement allowing US naval vessels to make contact with Soviet ships leaving Cuba to verify removal of the missiles. Khrushchev announced that the 40 Soviet missiles emplaced in Cuba were now on their way back to the Soviet Union.

8 Nov--The Defense Department announced that "all known" Soviet missile bases in Cuba had been dismantled and that a "substantial number" of them had been loaded aboard Soviet ships or were moving to port areas.

9 Nov--The Soviet Union gave the United States a list of 42 missiles and equipment to be removed from Cuba by 11 November.

20 Nov--Kennedy announced that he had received assurances that the IL-28 bombers Cuba had claimed as her own would be withdrawn shortly and that the US quarantine would be lifted.

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- 26 Nov--The United States rejected a joint Soviet-Cuban memorandum urging immediate US guarantees not to invade Cuba. The United States refused to give such a pledge until there had been on-site inspection and verification in Cuba as Khrushchev had agreed in his 28 October letter.
- 3 Dec--The Defense Department announced that the approximately 40 IL-28 bombers in Cuba were being returned to the Soviet Union.
- 7 Jan--The United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement terminating direct negotiations over the Cuban crisis due to the fact that Cuba refused to accept international inspection. The United States continued its refusal to be bound by a "no invasion" pledge.

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## APPENDIX C (U)

### CHRONOLOGY--THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS (1973)

- 5 Oct--Egyptian tanks and infantry crossed the Suez Canal at five points.
- Syria launched a two-pronged attack against Israel along the Golan Heights ceasefire line.
  - The US 6th Fleet was put on alert.
  - Both Egypt and Syria, in notes to the United Nations, accused Israel of starting the fighting.
  - In New York, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger discussed the crisis with Foreign Ministers Abba Eban of Israel and Muhammad al-Zayyat of Egypt.
  - King Feisal of Saudi Arabia sent a message to Kissinger calling on the United States to "force Israel to pull out of Arab lands and to restore the rights of the Palestinian people in their land."
  - Israel announced that she had been warned of the Egyptian and Syrian military buildups and had urged "political quarters" to take action to prevent the Arab attack.
  - Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said Israel sought to inflict "very heavy casualties" and to return to the 1967 ceasefire lines.
  - Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad reported that the Israelis had been concentrating troops for a week and that the Arabs had acted to prevent a surprise attack against their territory by Israel.
- 7 Oct--Israeli military spokesman Hayyim Herzog said Israel's territorial gains in 1967 had permitted her to forego a preemptive attack for political reasons.
- Iraq nationalized the American-owned Exxon and Mobil oil firms and announced Iraqi planes were on the way to the Suez. Algeria also reported planes were being sent to aid the fight in Egypt.
  - President Nixon instructed Kissinger to request a meeting of the UN Security Council.

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7 Oct--A US 6th Fleet task force left Athens for waters off Crete.

--Tunisia announced it would furnish troops to fight Israel.

--President Nixon and Soviet Party leader Brezhnev exchanged messages on the Middle East crisis.

8 Oct--Iraq unilaterally announced a resumption of diplomatic ties with Iran so that Iraqi troops could fight against Israel. Iran welcomed the Iraqi gesture.

--Herzog said that Israeli armored reserves had been mobilized and that the initiative was now in Israeli hands.

--Saudi forces were alerted.

--Egyptian commandos engaged Israeli troops at Sharm al-Shaykh.

--The United States asked the UN Security Council to halt the fighting and to restore the ceasefire lines that existed on the morning of 6 October. The USSR expressed support for Egypt and Syria by opposing the plan.

--The Sudan announced several armed units were being sent to the battlefield.

9 Oct--Israel launched counterattacks on both fronts at dawn. Egypt continued to send men and supplies across the Suez Canal.

--Israel reported Syria had launched 20 Soviet-built Frog rockets against Israeli civilian settlements.

--Israeli jets raided Damascus and bombed the Soviet Cultural Center, reportedly killing six Russians. Israel claimed the target in Damascus was actually the Syrian Defense Ministry.

--The Soviet Union sent messages to all Arab governments urging continued resistance to "Israeli aggression." The Algerian note stated: "Syria and Egypt must not be alone in their struggle. . . ."

--Israel abandoned the Bar Lev line and formed a new defense line 3 to 6 kilometers from the Canal.

10 Oct--Jordan ordered full military mobilization and a call-up of reservists.

--Egypt claimed advances in the Sinai in heavy tank battles.

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- 10 Oct--The United States said the Soviet Union was resupplying Syria and Egypt and that this would put a "new face" on the conflict.
- 11 Oct--Israeli forces penetrated 6 miles beyond the 1967 ceasefire line into Syria and bombed eight Syrian airfields.
- The United States said it was supplying ammunition and missiles to Tel Aviv in rush deliveries on orders placed before 6 October.
- A second US helicopter carrier was sent to the Mediterranean.
- 12 Oct--Secretary Kissinger admonished that a prolonged war would create "a high possibility of great power involvement" and that the Soviet airlift to the Arabs was "fairly substantial" but "moderate" and did not yet threaten detente. The United States, he added, sought "to end hostilities on terms that are just to all."
- The Israeli attack toward Damascus slowed down while Egyptian buildups continued on the east bank of the Canal.
- Egypt called the shipment of US arms to Israel "outright provocation of the Arabs" and warned of "consequences."
- 13 Oct--Jordan announced that a "detachment of its best military formations" had been sent to Syria.
- The United States announced preparations to send jet fighters to Israel to replace battle losses.
- Heavy tank battles were reported in the Sinai as Egyptian forces attempted to break through the Israeli defensive lines.
- Syria claimed to have contained the Israeli advance in the Golan Heights.
- US military sources said the Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria amounted to more than 100 flights since 9 October. A White House spokesman said it would create "serious difficulties" between the United States and the USSR if continued.
- 14 Oct--Egypt launched a major Sinai offensive.
- Kuwait announced that the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) would meet there on 16 October to discuss using oil as a weapon in the war.

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14 Oct--The NATO Secretary General said an oil cutoff by Arab states would "come very close to a hostile act."

--Mrs. Meir said Israel would respond quickly to any ceasefire proposal.

15 Oct--Robert McCloskey announced that the United States had begun to resupply Israel with military equipment to prevent a "massive airlift" of Soviet supplies to the Arabs from upsetting the military balance in the Middle East.

--Following talks in Moscow with Algerian President Boumedienne, the USSR announced "determination to assist in every way the liberation of all Arab territories occupied by Israel."

16 Oct--Egyptian President Sadat proposed a ceasefire to be followed by an Israeli withdrawal from land occupied in 1967 and a peace conference. He said Egypt had missiles capable of hitting any part of Israel but that the Arabs do not call for the "annihilation" of Israel.

--Kuwait announced a contribution of \$350,000,000 to the war effort.

--US officials said 25 F-4 Phantoms and 50 A-4 Skyhawks were being rushed to Israel to replace losses.

17 Oct--The Israeli Foreign Minister said Sadat's peace proposal was "totally unacceptable" and reiterated that there could be no political preconditions to a ceasefire. He added Israel was prepared to make "substantial compromises" for a final settlement "provided that our basic security is not affected."

--Eleven Arab oil-producing countries meeting in Kuwait announced that oil exports to countries "unfriendly" to the Arab cause would be reduced by 5 percent each month until the land occupied by Israel since 1967 is evacuated.

--Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin arrived in Cairo for talks with Sadat.

--Arab diplomats met in Washington with President Nixon to propose a peace plan and to urge direct US participation in mediation efforts.

18 Oct--Egypt announced that Kosygin had met three times with President Sadat in Cairo before returning to Moscow.

--Kuwait announced resumption of its \$48,000,000 annual subsidy to Jordan.

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- 18 Oct--Abu Dhabi announced a halt in all oil exports to the United States. Saudi Arabia said it was immediately cutting oil production by 10 percent to pressure the United States and warned that all oil exports would be cut if the United States continued to aid Israel.
- 19 Oct--Israeli forces drove 15 miles beyond the Suez Canal. Tank and artillery battles were reported on the Golan front.
- Nixon asked Congress for \$2.2 billion for emergency aid to Israel.
- Libya ordered a ban on all exports to the United States and raised the price of oil from \$4.90 to \$8.92 per barrel.
- 20 Oct--Secretary Kissinger flew to Moscow to discuss "means to end hostilities" and met for 2 hours with Brezhnev.
- Israeli advances on the west bank of the Suez continued.
- King Feisal announced his decision to halt all oil exports to the United States.
- 21 Oct--Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Dubai announced a total embargo of oil shipments to the United States.
- 22 Oct--The UN Security Council passed a joint US-Soviet sponsored resolution (#338) which called for a ceasefire in place to begin no later than 12 hours after the adoption of the resolution. The vote was 14 to 0, with China abstaining.
- Morning: Israel accepted the ceasefire proposal.
- Kissinger arrived in Israel from Moscow for talks with Israeli leaders.
- Israel announced it held an area 20 miles deep toward Cairo and 33 miles along the Canal, from the outskirts of Ismailia to 7 miles north of Suez city.
- Evening: Sadat announced Egyptian acceptance of the ceasefire on the condition that Israel simultaneously adhere to the resolution calling for withdrawal.
- The ceasefire went into effect on the Egyptian front at 6:52 pm, but fighting continued in Syria. Iraq rejected the ceasefire. Jordan announced acceptance, but added that its troops in Syria were subject to Syrian command.

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23 Oct--Heavy fighting resumed on the Egyptian front with both sides accusing the other of violating the ceasefire.

--Israeli troops on the west bank of the Suez surrounded the city of Suez and cut off completely the Egyptian 3rd Army on the east bank of the Canal.

--Dayan proposed a new ceasefire.

--The USSR accused Israel of violating the ceasefire and warned of "gravest consequences" if fighting continued. The statement called on Israel to pull back to the ceasefire lines of 22 October.

--The UN Security Council passed Resolution #339 calling for a ceasefire and the assignment of UN observers to supervise the ceasefire line.

24 Oct--Israel announced acceptance of a new UN-arranged ceasefire to begin at 7:00 am.

--The Israeli Foreign Minister stated the ceasefire was still in effect despite repeated violations. He added that Israel would enter negotiations with the position that "everything is negotiable."

--Sadat appealed to the United States and the USSR to send troops to police the ceasefire. The United States rejected the appeal and expressed the hope that other outside powers would not send troops to the Middle East.

25 Oct--Morning: The United States placed all military forces on alert as a "precautionary" measure in reaction to indications that the USSR was planning to send troops to the Middle East.

--Kissinger stated in a news conference that the United States opposed the "unilateral introduction by any great power . . . of forces into the Middle East, in whatever guise." He said US policy was to assist a UN observer force and to seek a political solution to the conflict.

--Afternoon: The Security Council voted 14 to 0 to establish an emergency peace force to insure the ceasefire.

--Egyptian spokesman Ashraf Ghurbal denied there were any Soviet troops in Egypt to enforce the ceasefire.

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- 26 Oct--Waldheim proposed a 7,000-man UN Emergency Force to police the ceasefire and said 897 UN troops had already been flown to Cairo from Cyprus.
- 27 Oct--The first contingent of UN observers reached the city of Suez.
- Israel proposed that a meeting be held between Israeli and Egyptian military leaders on the Suez front to discuss the problem of Egypt's trapped 3rd Army. The United States relayed the proposal to Egypt and the USSR.
- 28 Oct--Egypt accepted the Israeli proposal. One hour later, Israeli General Aharon Yariv met with an Egyptian general under UN auspices on the Cairo-Suez road and arranged for a convoy of Egyptian trucks to take non-military supplies to the trapped Egyptian 3rd Army. The Israelis stated they had agreed to the resupply only at American insistence.
- 31 Oct--President Nixon met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy in Washington.
- 1 Nov--President Nixon met with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in Washington.
- 7 Nov--The United States and Egypt announced resumption of diplomatic relations which had been broken off during the 1967 war.
- 9 Nov--Secretary Kissinger announced a pact in which Israel and Egypt agreed to honor the ceasefire, adjust truce lines and exchange war prisoners. In addition, Israel agreed to allow non-military supplies to pass through its lines to Egyptian troops isolated east of the Suez Canal.
- 11 Nov--A six-part ceasefire agreement was signed by Egypt and Israel at the checkpoint at kilometer marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road.

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## APPENDIX D (C)

### ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS (U)

	PEARL HARBOR	CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS	1973 ME CRISIS
PRIOR INDICATORS	Significant. Numerous diplomatic and military warnings; MAGIC, affects of embargo; rise of Yolo.	Significant. Refugee reports; military reconnaissance.	Significant. Inter-Arab datants; troop movements; official warnings; foreign intelligence.
IMPACT OF SURPRISE	Significant. Retaliatory powers of US crippled in Pacific; American public opinion unified.	Significant. US feared another Pearl Harbor attack. Soviet tactics assured US of European and Latin American support.	Conflicting. Led to initial Israeli setbacks but the predicted psychological damage to Arabs in terms of world opinion was not realized.
TIME CONSTRAINTS	Significant. Depleting oil reserves forced Japanese action; time on side of US; after attack military action outpaced political reaction.	Significant. US had to react before missiles were in place but also allow Soviets time to reassess their mistakes.	Significant. US had to react first to meet Soviet aircraft and later to prevent Soviet intervention.
IMPACT OF US INTERESTS	Significant. US reacted to protect its territory and to prevent the fall of its allies fighting in Europe.	Significant. US saw Soviet missiles as a direct military threat.	Significant. US sought to preserve Israeli security and prevent any power from gaining hegemony in ME.
IMPACT OF ADVERSARY INTERESTS	Significant. Japan acted to "save face" and obtain required natural resources.	Significant. Soviets sought to alter world strategic balance and discredit US credibility.	Significant. Soviets sought to expand influence in ME but her interest in datants with US was predominant.
IMPACT OF ALLIES' INTERESTS	Minimal. Both US and Japan acted on basis of national interest.	Minimal. Both US and Soviet Union acted on basis of national interest.	Minimal. All nations concerned acted primarily on the basis of national interest.
COORDINATION WITH ALLIES	Limited. US coordinated to a certain degree with allies. Japanese coordination with Axis was minimal.	Insignificant. US coordinated with allies after strategy was decided. Soviet Union negotiated without consulting Cuba.	Insignificant. US and Soviet Union acted independently and informed their allies of decisions made.
IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION	Insignificant. US public opinion was generally uninformed until after the attack.	Significant. Support of US allies and domestic solidarity surprised Soviets.	Significant. US public opinion favored support for Israel and datants with Soviet Union.
ROLE OF POLITICAL POWER	Minimal. US was unable to influence Japan politically. Japanese misperceived US political strength and will.	Significant. USSR misjudged Kennedy's resolve. Khrushchev saw Cuba as a means of strengthening his position internally.	Significant. Nixon forced Brashov not to carry out a private threat. Summits and diplomacy were well utilized.
ROLE OF MILITARY POWER	Conflicting. Japanese were aware of US military superiority, but Japan's military played a determining role in moving country to war.	Significant. Installation of the missiles would have meant a shift in the balance of power. Superior US force led to Russian retreat.	Significant. US military alert warned Soviets of American intentions. Respective great power reassured efforts heightened tensions.
ROLE OF ECONOMIC POWER	Significant. Joint US-British-Dutch boycotts and embargoes forced Japan to act.	Conflicting. US embargo assured Cuban dependence on Russia but had little impact on decisionmaking.	Conflicting. Arab oil forced some US moderation.
IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE	Significant. Data good, but US analysts misperceived Japanese intentions while Japanese analysts misperceived US psychological strength.	Significant. Data good, but US analysts misperceived Soviet intentions while Russian analysts misperceived US response.	Significant. Data good, but US analysts misperceived Arab intentions and Soviet response.
ALTERNATIVES	Limited. Japan felt she could only obtain her security through war with US. After the attack, the only US response considered was war.	Limited. (1) Do nothing. (2) Diplomatic protest. (3) Surgical air strikes. (4) Invade Cuba. (5) Total blockade. (6) Strategic quarantine.	Limited. (1) Match Soviet response; (2) Bow to Arab threats of reprisal. (3) Support great power military intervention; (4) Oppose US-USSR military intervention by diplomatic and military means.
NATURE OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESS	Limited. Japanese were left to determine US action.	Limited. Kennedy alone chose US strategy, although he was advised by a small ad hoc group (EXCOM).	Limited. Nixon and Kissinger were decision-makers. Advice flowed primarily from established groups.

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